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STATEMENT OF

JURISDICTIQN

This Court has jurisdiction ova I .

IMI.IIII IM "i

'i.ui Code Ann. § 78-2a-

3(2)(| i kxausi: tin- \ »is«- \\ a •; iraiisferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. See .
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). The Supreme Court's junMJ^non arose out ol I l"i il
Ann § 78-2-2f3)(j). ^iiic^ .lit-, appeal is
record ov

• nt of a court of

ive original appellate jurisdiction. See UTAH CODE
':

ANN I 78-2-2(3Ml)

• ••'..-

I S S U E S

Q N

Issue #1: Statutory Damages

' .

'

'•.

A p p E A L

der the Utah Consumer Sales

Practices 4 ct

A,

Statement of the Issue, Whether statutory damages and iitl-iincy fit's mn\ be
awarded In I'Linfifi uiulri Ihi 1 Ifah Consumer Sales Practices Act where
^ rendants (1) "clearly engaged in fraud" against Plaintiff by altering the
of a contract they executed \\ nil f'tiiiiiiii, (j | puisucd ntigain
Plaintiff to colic

- "Vaudulently-altered contract, and

(3) filed a negative statement on Plaintiffs credit repon. hut Plaintiff cannot
quantify the actual damages he has incunu, ^ *. u - ..
B.

Standard oi K a n v

^ \ dam

i- h

Hx:itu\i: "IMainlif'fs challenge only the district court's

inti., i'[)i"ii.il IIH- u i . . . me UCSPA and the district court's legal conclusion^]"
regarding that Act, appellate courts "grant no particular deu- .
district courts ruin ,_
-A/w ^

v,
M

)6K 'et uLu Holmes v. Am. States Im OA,

2000 UT App 85 at f 9, 1 P.3d 552, 555 (reviewing summary judgment
dismissal of UCSPA claim under same standard).
C.

Preservation at the Trial Court. [R. at 283-85; 394-408].

Issue #2; Res Judicata of Previously-Litigated Fraud and UCSPA Claims
A.

Statement of Issue. Whether, under the principle ofres judicata, the district
court should have granted summary judgment against Defendants on causes
of action for fraud and a violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act
when, in a previous action litigated between the same parties or their privies,
and following a full trial on the merits, the court entered a final order holding
that Defendants had "clearly engaged infraud"in altering the terms of the
parties' contract.

B.

Standard of Review. Because the issue is purely legal, and Plaintiff appeals
an order granting and denying motions for summary judgment, the standard
of review is de novo. See Armed Forces Ins. Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14,
^}13,70P.3d35.

C.

Preservation at the Trial Court. [R. at 114-16; 120-133].
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer sales
practices;
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and
unconscionable sales practices;
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices;
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent
2

with the policies of the Federal Trade Commissi • w ,.,.:.; ..
consumer protection
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative nuea. ^dh
respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact similar
laws; and
(6) to recognize and protcii '.iippliers who in good faith comply with the
provisions of this act.
Utah Code Ann, § 13 * * * Definitions
As used HI fins chapici:
(2) (a) \ -nsumer transaction'' mains a sale, lease,, assignment, award by
chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or
other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and.
insurance) to, or apparently to, a person for:
(i) primarily personal, family, or household purposes; or
(ii) purposes that relate to a business opportunity that requires:
(A) expenditure of money or proper? v m the person described in
Subsection (2)(a); and
(B) the person described in Subsection {2){'&) to perform personal
services on a continuing basis and in which the person described in
Subsection (2)(a) has not been previously engaged,
(b) "Consumer transaction55 includes:
(i) any of the following with respect to a transfer or disposition
described in Subsection (2)(a):
i A J n offer;
(B f a solicitation;
(C) an agreement; or
(D) performance of an agu
r
v - 3 charitable solicitation.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government,
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, association, cooperative, or any other legal entity.
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other
person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer
transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4(2). Deceptive act or practice by supplier
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a
deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally:
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied
in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not;
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not previously
been agreed to by the consumer . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2), (5). Actions by consumer
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $ 2,000,
whichever is greater, plus court costs.
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work
reasonably performed if:
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a
supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or
required by the court to be settled under Subsection 13-1 l-21(l)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case. Mr. Andreason agreed to purchase a membership at Gold's Gym
on the condition that his membership be month-to-month, not a full year's agreement, and
executed a Membership Agreement (the "Agreement") to that effect. [R. at 91]. When his
wife became ill after five months' use of Gold's Gym's facilities, Mr. Andreason sought to
terminate his membership, but Gold's Gym insisted that Mr. Andreason pay a full one-year
amount. [R. at 88-89]. Gold's Gymfileda negative statement on Mr. Andreason's credit
report and prosecuted a collection action against Mr. Andreason. [R. at 87-88].

ThQ collection action proceeded to trial [P at 86"! A? the trial.
action, both Mr. Andreason and counsel loi L-n
witnesses and •

:;

^
.. ,. examined

agreement into evidence. [11. at 85-86]. The

disf r'li court, examined Mr. Andreason's copy of his membership contract and compared it
with the cupy of the 'Ymver.ient offered into e> KICI^V : district court lui^; >..
.'"UKJicis

••

mib ol me contract aita Mr

'* u* '.-*™

^Li^k ruidcrcd the auKcmenl a full one-year cont-°r*

|R. at 72, 851. 1 lie court held that the contract entered into evklena.11 in t inltl s i .yni, ,,l,„i,:ti
"clearly fraud by Gold's""1 and thai """fiol<l.( : (iym engaged in fraud" against Mr. Andreason
r

•

acuon. [II. at 72,85]. Subseijn

'

\ndreason filed a

complaint against Defendants alleging, inter alia, causes of
of the Utah Consumer Sales PiaciiujM . tu |n .I
2 i miii'si

" •

«- *'ii*|i||iis

t

..

"M (he district court level in this case, Mr, Andreason filed a

motion for partial summary judgment on liability based on the doctrine of res judicata.
[R at 114-16; 120-133], After discovery, Defendant, innved lur summaiy judgment on
all in i\|ii

Midri ii'-oii1" cl'iini

\\! ;i( 257-267]. Mr. Andreason cross-moved for

summary judgment as to his fraud and UCSPA claims. [R. at 282-408].
3. Disposition in the District Cow
Muiion ior ljnf i" il Siiiiiiii-i" , hid

treasons
a Liability based on the Doctrine oi H.

Judicata, [R. at 158-011 i ,itn ihe district court denied Mr, Andreason's motion for
summary judgment as to his .fraud and li(.'SPA claims and granled I Vlendaiii •' I \1« l i o n
foi Summary Judgmein, dMH^smy Ihe ai. IIOII w it\ entirely
5

[R. at 547-51].

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE APPEAL1
1. At the time of the events at issue herein, Defendants Scott Felsted, Dean Viertel,
and Troy Peterson were the owners of Defendant Gold's Gym of Provo. [R. at
406 HI, 464 HI].
2. Defendant Gold's Gym of Provo is a d/b/a of Defendant Body Firm Aerobics, Inc.
[R. at 405 H 2, 464 H 1] (Defendants will hereinafter collectively be referred to as
"Gold's Gym").
3. On or about October 11, 1999. Andreason entered into a "Membership
Agreement" with Gold's Gym to use the Gold's Gym weight training facilities in
Provo (the "Agreement"). [R. at 405 f 4, 390-9112].2
4. Before signing the Agreement with Gold's Gym, Mr. Andreason explained to a
Gold's Gym representative, who identified himself only as "Pat," that he was not
interested in a full-year membership commitment. Mr. Andreason believes that
Pat represented to Mr. Andreason that the Agreement was for a month-to-month
term, cancelable on thirty days notices. [R. at 405 ^ 5; 390-91fflf2-3]. Gold's
Gym has admitted that its employee, Pat Baum, had discussions and/or dealings
with Mr. Andreason regarding the Agreement. [R. at 312-13]. Gold's Gym
asserts that its employees have never offered a month-to-month contract. [R. at
464 ^} 2]. However, Gold's Gym does not assert that it has personal knowledge of
1

Unless otherwise stated, all statements of fact herein are undisputed by the parties, as set
forth in the parties' summary judgment memoranda and appendices cited herein.
2

Gold's Gym did not oppose or dispute this statement in responding to Mr. Andreason's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 464].

the negotiations between Mr. Andreason and Pat Baum prior to the execution of
the Agreement, nor does it provide an affidavit from Mr. Baum regarding the
same. [R. at 464^2].
5. After Mr. Andreason received his copy of the Agreement, Gold's Gym or its
agents, employees, or representatives added additional information to the white
and pink copies of the Agreement. [R. at 405 ^ 6, 390 U 4, 464 % 1].
6. Gold's Gym has admitted that at least one of their employees was responsible for
the changes and additions to its version of the Agreement. [R. at 404-05 ^ 7, 464 ^
1].
7. The information that was added to Mr. Andreason's version of the Agreement
after Mr. Andreason signed the Agreement included an ending date to the
Agreement twelve months after the date the Agreement was executed. Gold's
Gym also admits that other terms were added or changed on their version of the
Agreement. [R. at 40418, 464 f 1]
8. Gold's Gym admits that the effect of these alterations was to increase the length of
the commitment purportedly agreed to by Mr. Andreason from a month-to-month
to a full-year commitment. [R. at 404 f 9, 464 f 1].
9. After using and paying for the facilities at Gold's Gym for about five months, Mr.
Andreason's wife became ill, and Mr. Andreason decided to terminate his
membership with Gold's Gym. Mr. Andreason gave Gold's Gym thirty days'
notice of his termination. However, Mr. Andreason was informed that he could
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not terminate his membership until he had been a member for a full year. [R. at
404 If 10, 464 If 1].
10. Gold's Gym further admits that it then attempted to force Mr. Andreason to pay
for an additional seven months of membership at Gold's Gym. [R. at 404 ^[ 11,
390 f 6, 464 f 3].
11. In or about October, 2000, Gold's Gym contracted with AFS, Inc., a debt
collection agency ("AFS"), to try to recover the remaining payments under the
terms of the altered Agreement on behalf of Gold's Gym [R. at 403 112, 389 U 8,
464 If 1].
12. On June 14, 2001, Mr. Andreason was served with a summons and complaint
brought by AFS. In its complaint, AFS sought payment of $182.21, plus court
costs and attorney fees. This complaint was solely based on Gold's Gym's version
of the Agreement, which had been altered by Gold's Gym to state that Mr.
Andreason had agreed to a full-year membership, when he had only agreed to a
month-to-month membership. [R. at 403 If 14, 3891 9, 464 f 1].
13. On November 2, 2001, at 9:00 a.m., a trial was conducted before the Honorable
Claudia Laycock in the matter styled AFS v. Rod Andreason Civ. No.
A010403063DC (the "Trial"). [R. at 403 115, 389110, 464 f 1]. At the Trial,
both sides examined witnesses and entered evidence into the record. [R. at 85-6].
14. At the conclusion of the Trial on November 2, 2001, Judge Laycock entered an
order, drafted by AFS's counsel, which made the following specific findings of
fact and conclusions of law:

The contract entered into evidence by Golds Gym is different than
Defendant's copy and is clearly fraud by Golds.
Neither contract is compliant with the Truth in Lending requirements.
Based upon the findings, the court makes the ruling that Golds Gym
engaged in Fraud and therefore finds in favor of the Defendant [Mr.
Andreason].
[R. at 72 (emphasis added), 402-03 f 17, 389 If 11,464 J 1].
15. Based upon these findings, the Court found in favor of Mr. Andreason and
dismissed the collection action against Mr. Andreason. [R. at 72, 402 % 18, 389 f
11,4641|1].
16.Neither AFS nor Gold's Gym has appealed this ruling. [R. at 402 % 19, 464 f 1].
17. It is unknown how many other persons have executed similar "Membership
Agreements" with Gold's Gym and suffered the same fraudulent actions by Gold's
Gym; Gold's Gym only asserts that Pat Baum, the employee who executed the
Agreement with Mr. Andreason, was terminated and "all contracts that were in
any collection process that he had written were removed to avoid this situation in
the future." [R. at 287 % 12].
18. In addition, when he was sued by AFS, Mr. Andreason was forced to devote
considerable amounts of time preparing for and defending himself at Trial,
including time and effort that he was then unable to devote to his employment.
[R. at 402 f 25, 388 ^ 15, 465 % 9 (disputing only that such efforts are
compensable damages)].
19. Gold's Gym has admitted that at some point during this dispute, it or AFS placed a
negative statement of debt owing on Mr. Andreason's credit report with one or

9

more credit reporting agencies. [R. at 287-88 ^f 10]. It is unknown on what date
this negative credit report was removed.
20. Mr. Andreason believes that he was forced to pay higher rates of interest on credit
cards and the home mortgage he obtained as a result of Gold's Gym or AFS
placing a negative statement on his credit report with one or more credit reporting
agencies. [R. at 402 f 23, 388 1f 15, 388 113, 465 1f 8 (disputing only the
existence of proof of such damages)].
21. On or about February 2, 2002, Mr. Andreason filed the instant action against
Gold's Gym asserting, inter alia, claims for fraud and a violation of the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act ("UCSPA"). [R. at 1-20].
22. On or about July 31, 2002, Mr. Andreason filed a motion for summary judgment
on his fraud and UCSPA claims based on the doctrine ofres judicata. [R. at 11433]. The district court determined that AFS was Gold's Gym's privy, but denied
that motion because it held that the prior court had not addressed the other
elements of fraud or the UCSPA. [R. at 159-61].
23. In or about March, 2003, Mr. Andreason and Gold's Gym filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. [R. at 257-270, 282-408]. The district court held that Gold's
Gym's actions were fraudulent and violated the UCSPA (§ 13-11-4(1)). [R. at 550
fflf 8-9]. However, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gold's
Gym and against Mr. Andreason because: (1) Mr. Andreason could not prove that
higher interest rates in his credit cards or home mortgage were due to Gold's
Gym's actions [R. at 548-49 1flj 15-22]; (2) the district court held that time spent
in

by Mr. Andreason defending himself at trial is not compensable damage [R. at 548
If 24]; and (3) statutory damages are impermissible under the UCSPA (§ 13-1119(2)) unless the claimant first establishes actual damages, which the court held
that Mr. Andreason had failed to do [R. at 548ffl[25-26, 30].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court held that Gold's Gym's actions in altering its Agreement with
Mr. Andreason and then suing him for extra monies under the altered Agreement were
fraudulent and violated the UCSPA, but nevertheless refused to grant Mr. Andreason
summary judgment on his USCPA claim and award statutory damages because Mr.
Andreason could not prove actual damages. However, the UCSPA provides for statutory
damages in lieu of actual damages. In fact, the entire purpose of statutory damages is to
provide some compensation to lawbreakers when actual damages are minimal or difficult
to calculate. In addition, wrongdoers such as Gold's Gym should not be benefited by
difficulty in calculating damages—particularly when they are the cause of such difficulty.
The purpose and stated liberal construction of the UCSPA militate in favor of such an
award. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the order of the district court granting
summary judgment in favor of Gold's Gym and against Mr. Andreason on his UCSPA
claim.
At the Trial of Gold's Gym's collection action (via a collection agency) against
Mr. Andreason—based on the fraudulently altered Agreement—the Trial court found that
Gold's Gym's copy of the Agreement had been altered and was clearly fraud by Gold's
Gym. This finding of fraud was between the parties or their privies in this case, is
11

identical to the fraud claim filed in this case, permitted Gold's Gym the full opportunities
of due process, and resulted in an adjudication on the merits. A violation of the UCSPA
was also encompassed within the Trial court's findings and Gold's Gym's admissions.
Thus, this Court should reverse the order of the district court in this case that denied Mr.
Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. ANDREASON'S
UCSPA CLAIM BECAUSE MR. ANDREASON WAS ENTITLED TO
STATUTORY DAMAGES IN LIEU OF ACTUAL DAMAGES
The district court held that Gold's Gym's actions were fraudulent and violated the

UCSPA. [R. at 5501fl[ 8-9]. Nevertheless, the court granted Gold's Gym's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Andreason's UCSPA claim on one ground: that
because Mr. Andreason did not prove actual damages, he is not entitled to relief under the
UCSPA. [R. at 548ffif25-26, 30]. However, the UCSPA provides for statutory damages
in lieu of actual damages. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2). In fact, the entire reason
for statutory damages is to compensate persons harmed by the actions of others where the
amount of damages is difficult to ascertain. Gold's Gym should not be benefited by the
difficulty of proof, particularly since it actually harmed Mr. Andreason and partly caused
such difficulty. Accordingly, the district court's order dismissing Mr. Andreason's
UCSPA claim should be reversed.
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A.

Standard of Review

When "Plaintiffs challenge only the district court's interpretation of... the
UCSPA and the district court's legal conclusion^]" regarding that Act, appellate courts
"grant no particular deference to the district court's rulings but review them for
correctness." Poulsen v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996); see also Holmes v. Am.
States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App 85 at ^ 9, 1 P.3d 552, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (reviewing
summary judgment dismissal of UCSPA claim under same standard).
B.

Statutory Damages May be Awarded Absent Proof of Actual Damages
Under the UCSPA
1.

Statutory Damages are an Alternative Under the UCSPA

The UCSPA provides for statutory damages as an alternative to actual damages.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2) states: "A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a
violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class action, actual damages or $2,000,
whichever is greater, plus court costs." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2). Hence, either
actual or statutory damages are available to consumers who suffer loss as a result of a
UCSPA violation. Although not defined in the statute, "loss" is considered "a generic
and relative term

not a word of limited, hard and fast meaning and has been held

synonymous with, or equivalent to 'damage', 'damages', 'deprivation', 'detriment',
'injury', and 'privation.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Ed. 1979); see also
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d Ed. 1969) ("The word is not one of limited,
hard and fast meaning. There are many kinds of loss, besides money out of pocket. No

man would doubt that he might rightly call a Moss' that event which changed his status
from solvency to insolvency.") Accordingly, pursuant to § 13-11-19(2), one who suffers
"damage, deprivation, detriment, injury, or privation" from a UCSPA violator may
recover either actual damages or statutory damages, whichever is greater.
In this case, Mr. Andreason has plainly suffered "damage, deprivation, detriment,
injury, or privation" due to Gold's Gym's acts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th
Ed. 1979). As a result of Gold's Gym's fraudulent alteration of the Agreement, Mr.
Andreason was sued by Gold's Gym and compelled to respond to the complaint and
defend himself at trial. [R. at 402 ^ 25, 388 1f 15]. In so responding, Mr. Andreason
incurred litigation costs and was absent from his employment. [Id.]. Most importantly,
Gold's Gym admits that it filed a negative statement on Mr. Andreason's credit report.
[R. at 287-88 ^ 10]. This negative statement damaged Mr. Andreason's credit, and may
have increased the interest rates Mr. Andreason was required to pay for a second
mortgage and credit cards Mr. Andreason obtained. [R. at 402 123, 388 1f 15, 388 If 13].
While a direct correlation between Gold's Gym's filing of the negative credit statement
and increases in Mr. Andreason's interest rates was not proven on summary judgment,
this was due at least in part to Gold's Gym's purported inability to identify when it filed
the negative credit statement [R. at 508-09]. In any event, the difficulty in calculating
damages does not alter the fact that Mr. Andreason suffered "damage, deprivation,
detriment, injury, or privation" due to Gold's Gym's unlawful acts.

2.

Wrongdoers Should Not Be Benefited By a Difficulty in
Calculating Damages

Moreover, Gold's Gym should not be absolved of its fraud because of the
difficulty of proving the damage it caused. It is a frequent maxim in Utah courts that:
"The fact that it is difficult to calculate damages will not prevent an injured party from
recovery." Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co. ,504 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah 1972); see
also Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Utah 1998) (citing
Monter); Atkin Wright & Miles v. The Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336
(Utah 1985). "It is, after all, the wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should
bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages." Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336.
In this case, the district court agreed that Gold's Gym violated the UCSPA [R. at
550 Yi 8-9]. Gold's Gym fraudulently altered its contract with Mr. Andreason and then
sued Mr. Andreason to enforce the contract under the altered terms. [R. at 404-05 <f|fl 6-9,
390 ^f 4,464 U 1]. It is unknown how many other persons have suffered the same harm at
Gold's Gym's hands; Gold's Gym only asserts that the employee who executed the
Agreement with Mr. Andreason was terminated and "all contracts that were in any
collection process that he had written were removed to avoid this situation in the future."
[R. at 287 f 12]. However, it is clear that Mr. Andreason was so harmed, and Gold's
Gym should not evade responsibility simply by the difficulty of proof.
In particular, Gold's Gym should not be absolved of its fraud due to the difficulty
in proving damages when it has been the cause of such difficulty. This is one of the
purposes of statutory damages. For example, under federal trademark law, statutory
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damages are provided as an alternate remedy for this reason. "Congress provided the
statutory damages option . . . due to the concern that a counterfeiter might hide, alter or
destroy records, thus making it impossible for a plaintiff to determine the actual scope of,
or be able to prove, actual damages." Lorillard Tobacco Co, v. S&M Cent. Serv., 2004
U.S. Dist. Lexis 22563 at *9 (N.D. 111. Nov. 8, 2004).
In this case, Gold's Gym admits that it filed a negative statement on Mr.
Andreason's credit report. [R. at 287-88 ^ 10]. However, it does not identify—or appear
to know—when itfiledthat statement. Hence, when Mr. Andreason attempted to assess
the damages caused by Gold's Gym's unlawful actions, he was unable to do so because
he could not ascertain what negative credit actions were caused by Gold's Gym's
negative credit statement. [R. at 508-09]. This court should not allow Gold's Gym to
evade the consequences of its fraud by failing to locate—or potentially hiding or
destroying—records of its wrongdoing.
3.

Statutory Damages Are Often Awarded When Actual Damages
Are Minimal Or Difficult to Prove

Furthermore, the main purpose of statutory damages3 is to provide plaintiffs with
at least some compensation when actual damages are difficult to prove. Federal courts

3

Other purposes of statutory damages that are applicable here include providing
wrongdoers with an incentive to obey the law, see Strange v. Wexler, 796 F. Supp. 1117,
1120 (N.D. 111. 1992) ("One purpose of statutory damages is to create an incentive to
obey the law."); discouraging wrongful conduct, see Alentino v. Chenson Enters., 938
F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that the purpose of statutory damages is also "to
discourage wrongful conduct") (quoting Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 233); and encouraging
consumers to act as "private attorneys general," see Scrimgeour, 149 F.3d at 327 n.l 1
(statutory damages created "[i]n order to encourage [plaintiffs] to act as 'private attorneys
general'"); Romero-Vargas v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1995) ("One
1£

have frequently held that "the purpose of statutory damages is to remedy a wrong which
would otherwise go unremedied if actual damages could not be proven." Raydiola Music
v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1990); see also Scrimgeour v.
IRS, 149 F.3d 318, 327 n.l 1 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that statutory damages were
available, in part, because "[a]ctual damages . . . can be hard to quantify"); Barber v.
KimbrelVs, Inc. 577 F.2d 216, 222 n.14 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Recognizing that it is difficult
for a consumer to prove actual monetary damages . . . , Congress imposed a civil penalty
('statutory damages') for non-compliance . .. ."); Marshall v. Music Hall Cent, 1995
U.S. Dist. Lexis 17904 at *9 n.8, Case No. 95-CV-70910 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 1995)
('The purpose of statutory damages is to allow relief... where the calculation of actual
damages . . . is too difficult or would be unfair.").
Hence, statutory damages are often awarded even if no actual damages are proven
or even alleged. See, e.g., Fenn v. MLeads, Enters., Inc., 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah
Adv. 37 (plaintiff only pleaded and was awarded $10 in statutory damages); F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 230 (1952) (recognizing that
the trial judge could exclude damages testimony "on the ground that authority to allow
statutory damages rendered proof of actual damages unnecessary"); Baker v. G.C. Servs.
Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982) (awarding statutory damages when no actual

purpose of the statutory damages of $1,000 is to provide an incentive for individuals who
have minimal damages to sue, thereby encouraging the widest possible citizen
enforcement through the judicial process.") (citation omitted).
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damages had been shown); Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221-22 (D.
Ore. 1981) ("A plaintiff need not show actual pecuniary damages in order for the court to
award statutory damages."); Woolfolkv., Rubin, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20964, Case No.
N-88-266 (EBB) (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 1990) ("Moreover, several courts have found that
actual damages need not be proven before statutory damages can be awarded.9').
It is unknown to what extent Mr. Andreason suffered due to Gold's Gym's
actions. However, even if the harm Mr. Andreason suffered was relatively minor, the
Utah Legislature has determined that a violation of the UCSPA warrants a unique cause
of action, statutory damages, and attorney fees. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19. As
this Court has previously held, "[W]e will not second-guess the legislature's
determination that this injury is far from trivial, but rather, serious enough to warrant a
cause of action that awards attorney fees as well as statutory damages." Weaver v.
DirectLink Media Group, LLC, No. 20030947-CA, 2004 UT App 471 n. 2004, Utah App.
Lexis 524 (Dec. 16, 2004) (reversing the trial court's dismissal of a cause of action under
Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105 when defendants sent only one unsolicited email in
violation of that law).
4.

The Legislature Has Mandated A Liberal Construction of The
UCSPA To Protect Consumers

Furthermore, the Legislature has stated that the UCSPA "shall be construed
liberally . . . to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and
unconscionable sales practices." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-2(2). The Supreme Court
has reaffirmed that "the legislature has mandated a liberal construction of the Act."

Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1015 (Utah 1991); see also State by Wilkinson v. B & H
Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D. Utah 1988) ("The Act is to be construed liberally 'to
protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales
practices . . . . " ) ; Holmes v. Am. States Ins., 2000 UT App 85 at ] 20, 1 P.3d 552 ("The
central purpose of the Sales Practices Act is 'to protect consumers from suppliers who
commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices.5") (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §
13-11-2(2)).
Accordingly, federal and state courts have extended the application of the UCSPA
beyond its plain terms to ensure such consumer protection. See Wade, 818 P.2d at 1015
(applying the UCSPA to residential leases, although such are not specified in the Act);
State by Wilkinson, 701 F. Supp. at 204 ("To interpret 'supplier' narrowly to include only
those in privity with the consumer would defeat the clear purpose of the Act, and could
not have been intended by the Utah legislature.").
In this case, Gold's Gym has plainly committed a deceptive and unconscionable
sales practice. Gold's Gym's actions were egregious, "clearly fraud," and worthy of
UCSPA policies. Failing to provide at least statutory damages would utterly frustrate the
clear legislative intent of the Act. Therefore, Mr. Andreason requests that this Court
reverse the order of the district court granting summary judgment against Mr. Andreason
and in favor of Gold's Gym regarding Mr. Andreason's UCSPA claim and order that Mr.
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Andreason is entitled to statutory damages and attorney fees4 pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§13-11-19(2).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. ANDREASON'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICA TA
In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability Under the Doctrine of

Res Judicata, Mr. Andreason set forth undisputed material facts establishing that under
that doctrine, Gold's Gym was liable to Mr. Andreason for fraud and a violation of the
UCSPA. [R. at 130-32]. In its responsive memorandum, Gold's Gym did not present
any disputed facts regarding Mr. Andreason's Motion. [R. at 140]. Nevertheless, the
district court denied Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. [R. at 16061]. Because the district court's ruling on summary judgment was in error, this Court
should reverse that decision.
A.

Standard of Review

"On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness and grant them no deference." Holmes v. Am. States Ins. Co.,
2000 UT App. 85, t 9, 1 P.3d 552, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Petersen v. Salt
Lake City, 1999 UT 93, \ 2, 987 P.2d 57 (Utah 1999)).
The standard for summary judgment is well-known, but bears repeating in this
context:

4

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(5), Mr. Andreason also seeks an award of his
attorney fees for the time during which he was represented by counsel, in an amount to be
determined by the district court.
on

The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). To establish a "genuine issue as to any material

fact," the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration (which were in effect at that date)5 first
required that Gold's Gym respond to the motion for summary judgment by showing the
existence of a "genuine issue," in the following manner:
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue of fact exists followed
by a concise statement of material facts which support the party's
contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference
to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's
statement.
UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-501(2)(B) (emphasis added). In addition, under Rule 56, Gold's
Gym was required to go beyond "mere allegations" to avoid summary judgment:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but in response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

5

This Rule has since been incorporated into the current Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7.
21

genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
B.

Gold's Gym Presented No Genuine Dispute as to Any Material Fact

In responding to Mr. Andreason's Motion for Summary Judgment, Gold's Gym
failed to present any "genuine issue as to any material fact" regarding Mr. Andreason's
claims.
In its Memo in Opposition, Gold's Gym admitted all facts necessary for summary
judgment; indeed, Gold's Gym admitted every fact presented by Mr. Andreason except
for the contents of an excerpt from the prior trial's transcript. [R. at 140]. However,
even without the trial transcript—which merely supplements the Court's Order—Gold's
Gym admitted that "Gold's Gym engaged in fraud," and that the altering of the contract
was "clearly fraud by Gold's Gym." [Id] The manner in which such fraud was executed
and the action of AFS "on behalf of Defendants" are also undisputed. [Id.]
Furthermore, in its Memo in Opposition, Gold's Gym did not present "a concise
statement of material facts which support the party's contention." UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN.
4. In addition, Gold's Gym did not "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(e). Gold's Gym presented no disputed facts
whatsoever. Instead, Gold's Gym "rest[ed] upon the mere allegations or denials of [its]
pleading." Id. These allegations are unsupported by any evidence, rule, statute, or
judicial determinations. Thus summary judgment should have been entered against
Gold's Gym.
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This result springs not merely from a technical violation of procedural rules.
Rather, as the Utah Supreme Court has held, the granting of a summary judgment "serves
the salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and expense of a trial" that would
otherwise be unnecessarily incurred. McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1980).
In this case, there would be no purpose in proceeding through the time and expense of
trial, given the clear and undisputed facts before the Court.
C.

Under Res Judicata, Mr. Andreason is Entitled to Judgment as a
Matter of Law on His Fraud and UCSPA Claims

It is undisputed that the trial court, after a full trial on the merits where Gold's
Gym was represented by counsel, made a factual finding and legal ruling that that "Golds
Gym engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by Gold's Gym after Mr.
Andreason received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72
(emphasis added), 402-03 % 17, 389111, 464 f 1]. This finding that Gold's Gym
"engaged in fraud" against Mr. Andreason was an issue that was actually litigated at trial
and was essential to the determination of a valid and final judgment between the parties.
[Id.]. Gold's Gym did not appeal this judgment. [R. at 402 % 19, 464 U 1]. Therefore,
based on the res judicata principle of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, Gold's Gym
is precluded from relitigating the issue of whether Gold's Gym committed fraud against
Andreason. Mr. Andreason's claims for Fraud and a violation of the UCSPA are both
based on the findings and conclusions made by the district court at Trial on fraud in the
previous adjudication. [R. at 80-86]. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Mr.
Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata,
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and judgment should have been entered against Gold's Gym as to Gold's Gym's liability
for Fraud and a Violation of the UCSPA.
1.

The Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Prohibits the Parties From
Relitigating The Issue of Gold's Gym's Liability For Fraud

According to the Utah Supreme Court, res judicata refers to the overall doctrine of
the preclusive effects to be given to prior court judgments. See In re Gen. Determination
of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 70 (Utah 1999). "Included within the doctrine
of res judicata is the law of'issue preclusion' also known as 'collateral estoppel.'" Id.
Specifically, issue preclusion arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties
or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully
litigated in the first suit. See Maoris & Assocs. Inc. v. Neways, Inc. 16 P.3d 1214, 1221
(Utah 2000); see also Berry v. Berry 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that where plaintiffs claims have been once defeated, plaintiff may not thereafter assert
the same claims against different defendants). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
four elements comprise issue preclusion:
1. The party against whom preclusion is asserted must have been a party to
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication;
2. The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one
presented in the instant action;
3. The issue in the first action must have been completely, fairly, and fully
litigated; and
4. The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d at 70; see also Searle
Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). All four parts of this test are clearly met
in this case.
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a.

Gold's Gym Was a Party to or in Privity With AFS, a
Party to the Prior Adjudication.

First, as the district court in this case acknowledged in its ruling [R. at 160],
Gold's Gym was clearly "party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication." In
re Gen. Determination ofRights to Use ofAll Water, 982 P.2d at 70. Gold's Gym
specifically directed AFS to take legal action to recover amounts owed under the
Contract to Gold's Gym. [R. at 403 \ 12, 389 If 8, 464 \ 1]. Gold's Gym was the real
party in interest: it merely directed AFS to recover amounts under the Agreement that it
claimed were owed to it. [Id]. Tellingly, in the Order of Dismissal drafted by AFS, the
district court referred to the "contract entered into evidence by Gold's Gym"—not AFS.
[R. at 72].
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that res judicata binds "one whose interest has
been legally represented at the time." Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah
1978). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court observed in Souffront v. Compagnie
des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 486 (1910) that the persons for whose benefit and at whose
direction a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be the strangers to the cause:
"who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish and protect his own
right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of
his own... is as much bound... as he would be if he had been a party to the record."
In this case, the interests of Gold's Gym were represented in the earlier litigation.
All of Gold's Gym's interests were aligned with those of AFS in that matter, i.e., to
recover money from Mr. Andreason. Moreover, Gold's Gym stood to gain by the fraud
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that was committed against Mr. Andreason through the alteration of the Agreement to
change its terms and bind Mr. Andreason to a commitment that he had not agreed to.
Therefore, Gold's Gym were effectively parties to the prior litigation.
Finally, the district court specifically directed its factual findings and ultimate
ruling to Gold's Gym, not AFS. At trial, the district court declared that "Golds Gym
engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by Gold's Gym after Mr. Andreason
received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72, 402-03 Tf 17,
389 ^f 11, 464 1f 1]. Therefore, it is clear that Gold's Gym was the real party in interest, or
at the very least in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.
b.

The issue Decided In The Prior Adjudication—Gold's
Gym's Fraud—Is Identical To The Fraud Claim In This
Action And Encompasses The Claim For Violation of The
UCSPA

Second, the fraud issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the current
Fraud claim and encompasses the claim for a violation of the UCSPA asserted in this
case.
i.

MR. ANDREASON'S FRAUD CLAIM

In the prior adjudication, the district court at Trial specifically held that "Golds
Gym engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by Gold's Gym after Mr.
Andreason received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72,
402-03 117, 389 ^ 11, 464 f 1]. The court at Trial further held: "Based on the findings,
the Court makes the ruling that Golds Gym engaged in fraud and therefore finds in favor

o f Mr. Andreason. [R. at 72]. Gold's Gym cannot dispute that the issue of fraud was
litigated in the previous action.
The issue of fraud is one of the precise claims that Mr. Andreason sought by his
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata. [R. at 11433]. In his Complaint, Mr. Andreason specifically pleaded a cause of action for Fraud.
[R. at 83-84]. This Fraud claim is identical to the fraud issue determined by this Court in
the prior adjudication. [R. at 72]. Moreover, this claim is indisputably identified in the
key factual findings and legal ruling made by the Court in the prior litigation. [Id.].
Thus, the current Fraud claim is identical to the fraud issue in the prior litigation.
In denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the district
court held that Mr. Andreason's fraud claim in this case was not identical to the court's
fraud determination at Trial because: "The Court's finding of fraud by Gold's Gym was
a response to Mr. Andreason's defense of fraud; the Court found that the contract was
unenforceable." [R. at 160]. However, this ruling was an erroneous determination of
law. In Utah, the elements of the "defense of fraud" are the same as the elements of the
"claim of fraud." See, e.g., Otsuka Electronics v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d
1274, 1278 (Utah 1997) ("To show their fraud defense is legally sufficient, appellants
must state . . . the circumstances supporting each element of fraud.") (stating the nine
elements necessary to prove a claim of fraud); Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos,
607 P.2d 798, 799-801 (Utah 1980) (holding that defense of fraud was established by
proof of all nine elements required to establish claim of fraud); Conder v. Hunt. 2000 UT
App Iff 13-15, 1 P.3d 558 (same). At trial, Mr. Andreason indisputably met the elements
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of fraud sufficient to prove a defense of fraud. [R. at 72, 160]. Because the elements of
the defense and claim of fraud are identical, the "identical issue" element is met in this
instance.
ii.

MR. ANDREASON'S CLAIM FOR VIOLATION
OF THE UCSPA

In denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the district
court held, without explanation, that "After reviewing the order itself and the verbal
findings of Judge Laycock, it is also clear that the Court did not address the elements
needed to establish liability under the theory of... the Consumer Sales Practices Act."
[R. at 160].
However, Gold's Gym has admitted that after Mr. Andreason received his copy of
the Agreement, Gold's Gym added additional information to the white and pink copies of
the Agreement, the effect of which was to increase the length of the commitment
purportedly agreed to by Mr. Andreason from a month-to-month to a full-year
commitment. [R. at 404 U 9, 405 f 6, 390 If 4, 46411]. Gold's Gym has also admitted
that it then attempted to force Mr. Andreason to pay for an additional seven months of
membership at Gold's Gym, including using a collection agency to prosecute a civil
action against Mr. Andreason to collect payment for the additional seven months. [R. at
4041| 11, 3901f 6, 464 f 3,403 f 12, 3891 8, 464 % 1]. In addition, at Trial, the district
court found that "Golds Gym engaged in Fraud" and that the Agreement altered by
Gold's Gym after Mr. Andreason received his copy of the Agreement was "clearly fraud
by Golds." [R. at 72, 402-03 1f 17, 389 f 11, 464 \ 1].
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These actions are squarely prohibited by the UCSPA. Under the UCSPA, a
supplier of consumer transactions6 commits a deceptive act or practice if it knowingly or
intentionally:
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in
accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; [or]
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not been
previously agreed to by the consumer.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§13-1 l-4(2)(e), (r) (2000).

Gold's Gym's actions were at least equal to, if not greater and more egregious
than, simply "knowingly indicating] that the subject of a consumer transaction has been
supplied in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§13-1 l-4(2)(e) (2000). In addition, Gold's Gym clearly attempted to "charge for a
consumer transaction that has not been previously agreed to by the consumer." UTAH
CODE ANN. §13-1 l-4(2)(r) (2000). The district court directly found that Gold's Gym
altered the Contract after Andreason received his copy and then attempted to recover
additional monies from him through AFS. [R. at 72]. Based on this finding and Gold's
Gym's own admissions, the district court should have granted summary judgment on Mr.
Andreason's UCSPA claim.

6

Gold's Gym does not dispute that it is a "supplier" under the Act. A "supplier" is
defined as "a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other person who regularly
solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals directly
with the consumer." UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-3(6).
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c.

The Issues of Fraud and UCSPA Violation Were
Competently, Fully, And Fairly Litigated In The Prior
Adjudication.

Third, as discussed above, it is clear that the above issues were fully litigated at
the Trial by Gold's Gym, through AFS. In dismissing Mr. Andreason's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, the district court stated that this element was not met
because: "The Court's order and verbal findings did not address the elements of fraud,
nor did they establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Gold's Gym had acted
fraudulently." [R. at 160]. However, the court at Trial was not compelled to recite every
element of fraud to render its determination. In addition, it is likely that if Mr.
Andreason, as the prevailing party, had been permitted to draft the Order—as opposed to
Gold's Gym's privy, AFS—the court's findings at Trial would have been more clearly
articulated. Moreover, the court's determination at Trial indicates that it was rendered
based on clear and convincing evidence, as shown in the Order drafted by AFS's own
counsel: "The contract entered into evidence by Golds Gym is different than Defendants
copy and is clearly fraud by Golds." [R. at 72 (emphasis added)]. The lack of specificity
by AFS in the Order it drafted should not compel the parties to completely relitigate the
issue of fraud.
Regardless, Utah courts have explained that the "full and fair litigation" element
stems not from an exhaustive recitation of the elements of each claim, but from
fundamental due process—that litigants have their day in court. See Copper State Thrift
& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted); see also

Berry v. Berry 738 P.2d 246, 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). For purposes of due process, the
parties must receive notice reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to
apprise them of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. See id.
At Trial, Gold's Gym had their day in court—they specifically demanded it. [R. at
403 1f 14, 389 U 9, 464 ^ 1]. Moreover, they were clearly represented by counsel. [R. at
72]. In fact, Gold's Gym was the only party that was represented by counsel at Trial.
[Id.]. Gold's Gym entered documents into evidence. [Id.]. Finally, Gold's Gym cannot
dispute that at Trial, both sides were permitted the opportunity to present facts and legal
argument in their support, as well as introduce and cross-examine witnesses—both of
which Gold's Gym did. Clearly, Gold's Gym was afforded the full protections of due
process in this matter, and thus the "full and fair litigation" element of issue preclusion
has been met.
d.

There Was A Final Adjudication In The Previous Action.

Finally, it is undisputed that there was afinaladjudication on the merits in the
previous case. The district court's Order On Dismissal was based upon specific findings
of fact and rulings of law, and constituted a dismissal on the merits. Specifically, the
court held: "Based upon thefindings,the court makes the ruling that Golds Gym
engaged in fraud and therefore finds in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff takes nothing
and the case is hereby dismissed." [R. at 72]. This was clearly an adjudication on the
merits.

In addition, Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant
part:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of
an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(b) (emphasis added). The trial court's Order did not specify that the
dismissal did not operate as an adjudication on the merits. [R. at 72]. In addition, the
Order did not dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or lack of an
indispensable party. [Id]. Therefore, by the plain language of Rule 41(b), the district
court's Order On Dismissal operated as a final adjudication of the prior case on the
merits.
2.

The District Court Erred in Refusing to Enter Partial Summary
Judgment As To Gold's Gym' Liability For Fraud and a
Violation Of The Consumer Sales Practices Act

Because all four elements of issue preclusion are met, this Court should reverse
the district court's order denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata and order that the district court enter partial summary
judgment against Gold's Gym as to their liability for Fraud and a violation of the
Consumer Sales Practices Act.
Moreover, courts in Utah and throughout the United States have extolled the
benefits of issue preclusion in reducing litigation costs and conserving judicial resources.
The United States Supreme Court explained this doctrine in the matter of Montana v.
United States 440 U.S. 147 (1979), wherein the Court stated:

To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and
vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of
inconsistent decisions.
Id. at 153. These interests are particularly involved in this case. It would be unduly
burdensome and patently unfair to compel Mr. Andreason to demonstrate yet again that
Gold's Gym committed fraud against him by analyzing the parties' transactions and
reviewing the different copies of the parties' Contract. Withholding summary judgment
on this issue would also render the entire matter litigated before this Court a nullity, not
to mention a waste of the district court's time and effort.
Finally, relitigation of the fraud issue would create the possibility of inconsistent
decisions on the litigated issue, which would be unfair to Mr. Andreason and all parties
similarly situated. Such inconsistency undermines the public's confidence in the fair
administration of justice in our courts. For all of these reasons, partial summary
judgment as to Gold's Gym's liability for fraud and a violation of UCSPA should be
entered.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated herein, Mr. Andreason respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the Order of the district court granting summary judgment to Gold's Gym
and denying summary judgment to Mr. Andreason regarding his claim for statutory
damages pursuant to the UCSPA. In addition, Mr. Andreason requests that this Court
reverse the order of the district court denying Mr. Andreason's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata and hold that summary judgment

is proper regarding Mr. Andreason's claims against Gold's Gym for Fraud and a violation
of the UCSPA based upon res judicata.
)th

Dated this 8"1 day of June, 2005
B

y-V
Rod N. Andreason
901 West Potomac Dr.
Murray, UT 84123
(801) 350-7801 (telephone)
(801) 531-1486 (facsimile)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, on this 8th day of June, 2005 to the
following:
Brian C. Harrison
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C.
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo,Utah 84604
Attorneys for Defendants

Km N. Andreason
^
901 West Potomac Dr.
Murray, UT 84123
(801) 350-7801 (telephone)
(801) 531-1486 (facsimile)
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KEVIN G. RICHARDS, P.C. (#533 9)
RAYMOND B. ROUNDS (#5012)
KEVIN G. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3839 S. West Temple Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
801-281-4222
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFS.,INC.
)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
PURSUANT TO TRIAL

Plaintiff,
)
)

vs.

CIVIL NO.010403063DC
ROD ANDREASON
Defendant(s).

)

Judge Laycock

This matter came on regularly before the court for Trial
on November 2, 2001.

Plaintiff appeared by and through attorney,

Ron J. Noyes, who stood in for Kevin G. Richards; Defendant was
also present.
1.

The Court made the following findings:

The contract entered into evidence by Golds Gym is

different than Defendants copy and is clearly fraud by Golds.
2.

Neither contract is compliant with the Truth in Lending

requirements.
Based upon the findings, the court makes the ruling that Golds
Gym engaged in Fraud and therefore finds in favor of the Defendant.

Tab 2

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROD N. ANDREASON

Ruling
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 020400494

SCOTT FELSTEDT, an individual, DEAN
VIERTEL, an individual, TROY
PETERSON, an individual, BODY FIRM
AEROBICS, INC., a Utah Corporation, and
GOLD'S GYM OF PROVO a/k/a GOLD'S
GYM, an unregistered d/b/a/ of Body Firm
Aerobics, Inc.
Defendant.

Date: October 2,2002
Judge Claudia Laycock

This matter came on regularly before Judge Laycock on September 30, 2002, on plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. After reviewing the file, memoranda, and argument of
the parties the Court makes the following ruling.
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, Mr. Andreason, has asked this Court to grant partial summary judgment against
the listed defendants in this case on the issues of (1) fraud, (2) violation of the Consumer Sales
Practices Act, and (3) conspiracy to commit fraud. Plaintiff asserts that the AFS v. Andreason,
Case No. 010403063 ("AFS case") precludes these issues from being re-litigated under the
doctrine ofres judicata or specifically issue preclusion.
On November 2, 2001, AFS v. Andreason was tried before Judge Laycock. Gold's Gym,
through the collection agency it hired, sued the plaintiff for failure to make payments under a
contract the parties entered into on October 11, 2000. Judge Laycock dismissed the action

1

against Mr. Andreason and stated that Gold's Gym had acted fraudulently in entering into a
contract with Mr. Andreason. AFS's counsel prepared the order which was later signed by the
Court.
The plaintiff contends that this order and the verbal findings entered by the Court are
sufficient to establish that Gold's Gym acted fraudulently when it induced the plaintiff to enter
into the contract that was at issue in the AFS case. Plaintiff asserts that the issues should not be
re-litigated because of issue preclusion. The Court disagrees with this contention.
In order to establish issue preclusion, the following four elements must be present. First,
the party in the present case must have been a party to or in privity with the party who was
involved in the prior case. Second, the issue in the present action must be identical to that
decided in the previous case. Third, the previous matter must have been fairly and fully litigated.
Fourth, there must have been a final decision on the merits.
Although the plaintiff has shown that Gold's Gym was in privity with AFS in the AFS
case, the Court finds that the order and verbal findings entered by the Court are insufficient to
establish the other three elements of issue preclusion. The Court's finding of fraud by Gold's
Gym was a response to Mr. Andreason's defense of fraud; the Court found that the contract was
unenforceable. The Court's order and verbal findings did not address the elements of fraud, nor
did they establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Gold's Gym had acted fraudulently.
After reviewing the order itself and the verbal findings of Judge Lay cock, it is also clear
that the Court did not address the elements needed to establish liability under the theory of
conspiracy and the Consumer Sales Practices Act. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
2

DATED this 2nd day of October 2002.

«8# V ?
Sw y,<

/M„,

'

% CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
_
F O U R T H DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case No. 020400494

3

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I sent a true and correct copy of this document to the following on
the 7^_ day of October 2002:
Mark W. Pugsley
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

36 South Main Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Brian C. Harrison
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo, UT 84604
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MARK W. PUGSLEY (AS253)
JACQUELYND. ROGERS (A9062)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South Main Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone; (801)532-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff Rod N. Andreason
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROD N. ANDREASON,
ORDER
Plaintiff
Civil No. 020400494
vs.
SCOTT FELSTED, an individual, DEAN
VIERTEL, an individual, TROY
PETERSON, an individual, BODY FIRM
AEROBICS, INC., a Utah Corporation, and
GOLD'S GYM OF PROVO a/k/a GOLD'S
GYM, an unregistered d/b/a of Body Firm
Aerobics, Inc.

Judge: Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on July 3,2003, Plaintiff being
represented by his attorneys, Mark Pugsley and Jacqueline Rogers, and the Defendants being
represented by their attorney, Brian C. Harrison, and the Court having considered the Motions
for Summary Judgment presented by both sides and having considered the evidence onfileand
the argument of counsel and being fully advised therein;

•1/H

•••IV

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
L

Defendants are the owners of Gold's Gym.

2.

Plaintiff ajrid Defendants entered into a contract on October 11, 1999.

3.

Pat Baum., an employee of the Defendants, changed several terms of the contract,

which converted the contract into a twelve-month agreement after the execution of said contract
by the parties.
4.

Plaintiff terminated his contract with the Defendants after five (5) months.

5.

Defendants attempted to enforce said contract.

6.

In October 2000, Defendants employed a collection agency named AFS, Inc. to

file a small claims action to have said contract delinquencies reduced to judgment.
7.

In prosecuting the small claims action against Plaintiff, AFS, Inc. filed a negative

statement on Plaintiffs credit report.
8.

Said case was dismissed by the Court based upon thefraudulentaction of Gold's

9.

Said act described above constitutes a violation of Section 13-11-4(1) Utah Code

Gym.

Annotated.
10.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has suffered loss or damages that were

caused by Defendants' actions, as required under Section 13-11-19(2) Utah Code Annotated.
11.

Defendants placed the issue of damages before the Court by their Motion for

Summary Judgment and supporting Affidavit, at which point Plaintiff had the burden of showing
disputed facts related to damages.
12.

Plaintiff failed to carry his burden by failing to demonstrate that he had sustained

any loss or damages that were caused by Defendants' actions.

13.

All fact discovery has been completed in this case.

14.

Based upon Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Walker case, the

Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any loss or damages which puts said
issues at issue.
15.

The Court finds that the credit card statements contained variable interest rates

and that no showing was made connecting the change in the variable rate on said credit cards
with any actions taken by the Defendants herein.
16.

The Court further finds that the credit card interest rates increased on occasion

and decreased on occasion and that no evidence was put forth by Plaintiff to show the reason
therefor.
17.

The Court concludes that said interest ratefluctuationscould be caused by a late

payment history of the Plaintiff economic factors unknown to the parties, and other reasons,
18.

The Court finds no genuine dispute of material fact as it relates to loss or damage

sustained by the Plaintiff.
19.

With reiapect to the mortgage interest rate, Plaintiff has produced no evidence

showing that he has incurred a higher rate of interest by virtue of any actions taken by the
Defendants herein.
20.

The Court concludes that numerous factors are considered in arriving at a credit

score and that no evidence has been received in this case regarding Plaintiffs credit score.
21.

Since all fact discovery is complete, any connection between the mortgage

interest rate obtained by Plaintiff and any actions by the Defendants is completely a matter of
speculation.

22.

The intereirt rate on the MBNA Platinum card and the evidence submitted in

support thereof show thai Plaintiff had made two late payments, maintained a high balance, and
that no connection has been established between the actions of the Defendants and the interest
rate on said credit card.
23.

Plaintiff asserted that he incurred a $20.00 cancellation fee for canceling the

automatic withdrawal authorizationfromhis bank. No evidence was presented to support said
claim and therefore the Courtfindsthat Plaintiff did not sustain damage in this matter.
24.

The Court concludes that the time Plaintiff spent in defending himself against the

action filed by AFS, Inc. is not damage that can be awarded under Utah Code Aim. § 13-1119(2) and further finds that no authority has been provided which allows for time spent preparing
for a municipal case to be considered as damages under that statute.
25.

Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(2) requires that the claimant establish some loss or

damage in order for said Section to apply. This Plaintiff has failed to do.
26.

Plaintiff having failed to prove damages suffered as a result of Defendants'

actions is not entitled to statutory damages, attorney's fees, court costs, or other claims against
the Defendants.
27.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

28.

Plaintiff has previously withdrawn causes of action based upon conspiracy and

consumer fraud.
29.

By this Ruling, the Courtfindsno cause of action on Plaintiffs first and third

causes of action for the reasons heretofore stated.
30.

Because Plaintiff has failed to cany his burden of proof regarding the issue of loss

and damages, the Court rules in favor of the Defendants herein.

31.

All other pending motions are hereby rendered moot by virtue of this Court's

ruling in favor of the Defendants,
32.

This Court therefore dismisses all causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff herein

and grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; Said judgment is to be on the merits
and with prejudice.

DATED this jp

day o f f T O ,

>200ft
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Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2005 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
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TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2 (2005)
§ 13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer sales practices;
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales
practices;
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices;
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not inconsistent with the policies
of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer protection;
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with respect to the subject
of this act among those states which enact similar laws; and
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply with the provisions of this
act.
HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 2.
NOTES:
MEANING OF "THIS ACT". -See the note under this catchline under § 13-11-1.
FEDERAL LAW. —For Federal Trade Commission Act, see 15 U.S.C. 5 41 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
CITED in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991V
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this
article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES

GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-3 (2005)
§ 13-11-3. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Charitable solicitation" means any request directly or indirectly for money, credit,
property, financial assistance, or any other thing of value on the plea or representation that it
will be used for a charitable purpose. A charitable solicitation may be made in any manner,
including:
(a) any oral or written request, including a telephone request;
(b) the distribution, circulation, or posting of any handbill, written advertisement, or
publication; or
(c) the sale of, offer or attempt to sell, or request of donations for any book, card,
chance, coupon, device, magazine, membership, merchandise, subscription, ticket, flower,
flag, button, sticker, ribbon, token, trinket, tag, souvenir, candy, or any other article in
connection with which any appeal is made for any charitable purpose, or where the name of
any charitable organization or movement is used or referred to as an inducement or reason
for making any purchase donation, or where, in connection with any sale or donation, any
statement is made that the whole or any part of the proceeds of any sale or donation will go
to or be donated to any charitable purpose. A charitable solicitation is considered complete
when made, whether or not the organization or person making the solicitation receives any
contribution or makes any sale.
(2) (a) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or
other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or other property, both
tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance) to, or apparently to, a person for:
(i) primarily personal, family, or household purposes; or
(ii) purposes that relate to a business opportunity that requires:
(A) expenditure of money or property by the person described in Subsection (2)(a);

and
(B) the person described in Subsection (2)(a) to perform personal services on a
continuing basis and in which the person described in Subsection (2)(a) has not been
previously engaged.
(b) "Consumer transaction" includes:
(i) any of the following with respect to a transfer or disposition described in Subsection
(2)(a):
(A) an offer;
(B) a solicitation;
(C) an agreement; or
(D) performance of an agreement; or
(ii) a charitable solicitation.
(3) "Enforcing authority" means the Division of Consumer Protection.
(4) "Final judgment" means a judgment, including any supporting opinion, that determines
the rights of the parties and concerning which appellate remedies have been exhausted or
the time for appeal has expired.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government, governmental subdivision or
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, cooperative, or any other legal
entity.
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other person who
regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals
directly with the consumer.
HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 3; 1983, ch. 58, § 4; 1987, ch. 105, § 2; 2000, ch. 57, § 1;
2004, ch. 55, § 1.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, inserted "including the
use or misuse of personal identifying information of any person in relation to a consumer
transaction to, or apparently" in Subsection (2), making a related punctuation change.
The 2004 amendment, effective March 15, 2004, deleted "including the use or misuse of
personal identifying information of any person in relation to a consumer transaction" from the
introductory part of Subsection (2)(a) and made numerous stylistic changes.
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Division of Consumer Protection, § 13-2-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
i
Consumer transaction.

±

Supplier.

±

Cited.
CONSUMER TRANSACTION.
In view of (1) the legislatures mandate to construe the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act
(UCSPA) liberally, (2) the stated purpose of keeping Utah law consistent with the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 5 41 et seq.) and the consumer protection laws of other
states, and (3) the absence of any language or other expression of legislative intent to the
contrary, the renting of residential housing is a consumer transaction within the meaning of
the UCSPA. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991).
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act applies to leases of residential property.
Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997).
SUPPLIER.
This chapter is broad enough to impose liability upon suppliers of consumer goods who
deceptively transact with other suppliers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp.
201 (D. Utah 1988).
Defendants, who were alleged to have tampered with vehicle odometers with the intent to
defraud purchasers, were not insulated from liability for deceptive acts merely because they
sold the vehicles involved to independent dealers for resale, rather than directly to
consumers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201 (D. Utah 1988).
CITED in Heard v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, 216 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2000).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. —Who is a "consumer" entitled to protection of state deceptive trade practice and
consumer protection acts, 63 A.L.R.5th 1.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this
article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES

GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4 (2005)
STATUS: CONSULT SLIP LAWS CITED BELOW FOR RECENT CHANGES TO THIS
DOCUMENT
• LEXSEE 2005 Ut. HB 30 - See section 1.
• LEXSEE 2005 Ut. HB 186 - See section 2.
§ 13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction
violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction.
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a deceptive act or
practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally:
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, approval,
performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it has not;
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular standard, quality,
grade, style, or model, if it is not;
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or
has been used to an extent that is materially different from the fact;
(d) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the consumer for a
reason that does not exist;
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied in accordance
with a previous representation, if it has not;
(f) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction will be supplied in greater quantity
than the supplier intends;
(g) indicates that replacement or repair is needed, if it is not;
(h) indicates that a specific price advantage exists, if it does not;

(i) indicates that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation the supplier does
not have;
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, a
disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations,
if the representation is false;
(k) indicates that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an
inducement for entering into a consumer transaction in return for giving the supplier the
names of prospective consumers or otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other
consumer transactions, if receipt of the benefit is contingent on an event occurring after the
consumer enters into the transaction;
(I) after receipt of payment for goods or services, fails to ship the goods or furnish the
services within the time advertised or otherwise represented or, if no specific time is
advertised or represented, fails to ship the goods or furnish the services within 30 days,
unless within the applicable time period the supplier provides the buyer with the option to
either cancel the sales agreement and receive a refund of all previous payments to the
supplier or to extend the shipping date to a specific date proposed by the supplier, but any
refund shall be mailed or delivered to the buyer within ten business days after the seller
receives written notification from the buyer of the buyer's right to cancel the sales agreement
and receive the refund;
(m) fails to furnish a notice of the purchaser's right to cancel a direct solicitation sale within
three business days of the time of purchase if the sale is made other than at the supplier's
established place of business pursuant to the supplier's personal contact, whether through
mail, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, telephone, or any other form of direct
solicitation and if the sale price exceeds $ 25, unless the supplier's cancellation policy is
communicated to the buyer and the policy offers greater rights to the buyer than this
Subsection (2)(m), which notice shall be a conspicuous statement written in dark bold at
least 12 point type, on the first page of the purchase documentation, and shall read as
follows: "YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS CONTRACT AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT
OF THE THIRD BUSINESS DAY (or time period reflecting the supplier's cancellation policy but
not less than three business days) AFTER THE DATE OF THE TRANSACTION OR RECEIPT OF
THE PRODUCT, WHICHEVER IS LATER.";
(n) promotes, offers, or grants participation in a pyramid scheme as defined under Title 76,
Chapter 6a, Pyramid Scheme Act;
(o) represents that the funds or property conveyed in response to a charitable solicitation
will be donated or used for a particular purpose or will be donated to or used by a particular
organization, if the representation is false;
(p) if a consumer indicates his intention of making a claim for a motor vehicle repair
against his motor vehicle insurance policy:
(i) commences the repair without first giving the consumer oral and written notice of:
(A) the total estimated cost of the repair; and
(B) the total dollar amount the consumer is responsible to pay for the repair, which
dollar amount may not exceed the applicable deductible or other copay arrangement in the
consumer's insurance policy; or
(ii) requests or collects from a consumer an amount that exceeds the dollar amount a

consumer was initially told he was responsible to pay as an insurance deductible or other
copay arrangement for a motor vehicle repair under Subsection (2)(p)(i), even if that amount
is less than the full amount the motor vehicle insurance policy requires the insured to pay as
a deductible or other copay arrangement, unless:
(A) the consumer's insurance company denies that coverage exists for the repair, in
which case, the full amount of the repair may be charged and collected from the consumer;
or
(B) the consumer misstates, before the repair is commenced, the amount of money
the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay as a deductible or other copay
arrangement, in which case, the supplier may charge and collect from the consumer an
amount that does not exceed the amount the insurance policy requires the consumer to pay
as a deductible or other copay arrangement;
(q) includes in any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer
transaction, or any addendum to any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a
consumer transaction, any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which
a consumer is entitled under this chapter;
(r) charges a consumer for a consumer transaction that has not previously been agreed to
by the consumer; or
(s) solicits or enters into a consumer transaction with a person who lacks the mental ability
to comprehend the nature and consequences of:
(i) the consumer transaction; or
(ii) the person's ability to benefit from the consumer transaction.

HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 4; 1983, ch. 55, § 1; 1983, ch. 58, § 5; 1985, ch. 250, § 1;
1987, ch. 105, § 3; 1995, ch. 237, § 1; 1998, ch. 194, § 1; 1999, ch. 21, § 8; 2001, ch.
196, § 1; 2004, ch. 55, § 2.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection (2)
(P)The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, inserted "this" before "Subsection (2)(m)"
near the middle of Subsection (2)(m).
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added Subsections (2)(q) and (r); in
Subsection (2)(m), substituted "personal contact, whether through mail, electronic mail,
facsimile transmission, telephone, or any other form of direct solicitation" for "mail,
telephone, or personal contact"; and made related changes.
The 2004 amendment, effective March 15, 2004, added Subsection (2)(s) and made
related changes.
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Identity fraud, criminal provisions, § 76-6-1101 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

±

Cause of action.
i
— Misrepresentation of warranty.

±

Transactions with other suppliers.
i
Cited.
CAUSE OF ACTION.
-- MISREPRESENTATION OF WARRANTY.
Claim that roof shingle manufacturer, through its literature or agent, made an express
warranty to homeowner and later tried to disclaim or ignore that warranty and supplant it
with a limited written warranty stated a cause for relief under Subsection (2)(j). State ex rel.
Division of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988).
TRANSACTIONS WITH OTHER SUPPLIERS.
This chapter is broad enough to impose liability upon suppliers of consumer goods who
deceptively transact with other suppliers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp.
201 (D. Utah 1988).
Defendants, who were alleged to have tampered with vehicle odometers with the intent to
defraud purchasers, were not insulated from liability for deceptive acts merely because they
sold the vehicles involved to independent dealers for resale, rather than directly to
consumers. Utah ex rel. Wilkinson v. B & H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201 (D. Utah 1988;).
CITED in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
TREATISES. --Thomas and Backman, Utah Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), § 5.08(c)
(5).
A.L.R. —Liability for delay in making repair of motor vehicle, 44 A.L.R.4th 1174.
Real-estate broker's liability to purchaser for misrepresentation or nondisclosure of physical
defects in property sold, 46 A.L.R.4th 546.
Liability of telephone company for mistakes in or omissions from its directory, 47 A.L.R.4th
882.
What goods or property are "used," "secondhand," or the like, for purposes of state
consumer laws prohibiting claims that such items are new, 59 A.L.R.4th 1192.
Products liability: roofs and roofing materials, 3 A.L.R.5th 851.
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this
article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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§ 13-11-19. Actions by consumer
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an adequate remedy at
law, a consumer may bring an action to:
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this chapter; and
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has violated, is
violating, or is likely to violate this chapter.
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may recover, but not
in a class action, actual damages or $ 2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs.
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an adequate remedy
at law, he may bring a class action for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and appropriate
ancillary relief against an act or practice that violates this chapter.
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may bring a
class action for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this
chapter by a rule adopted by the enforcing authority under Subsection 13-11-8(2) before the
consumer transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or
13-11-5 by a final judgment of the appropriate court or courts of general jurisdiction and
appellate courts of this state that was either officially reported or made available for public
dissemination under Subsection 1 3 - l l - 7 ( l ) ( c ) by the enforcing authority ten days before the
consumer transactions on which the action is based, or with respect to a supplier who agreed
to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent judgment which became final
before the consumer transactions on which the action is based.
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and the
damages can be computed with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on behalf of
consumers who cannot be located with due diligence shall be transferred to the state
treasurer pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act.
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of this chapter

resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid the error, recovery under this section is limited to the amount, if any, in
which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation.
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may award to the
prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed if:
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this chapter has brought
or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a supplier has committed an act or
practice that violates this chapter; and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or required by the
court to be settled under Subsection 13-ll-21(l)(a).
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final judgment in favor
of the enforcing authority under Section 13-11-17 is admissible as prima facie evidence of
the facts on which it is based in later proceedings under this section against the same person
or a person in privity with him.
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the prevailing party shall mail a copy
to the enforcing authority for inclusion in the public file maintained under Subsection 13-11-7

(D(e).
(8) An action under this section must be brought within two years after occurrence of a
violation of this chapter, or within one year after the termination of proceedings by the
enforcing authority with respect to a violation of this chapter, whichever is later. When a
supplier sues a consumer, he may assert as a counterclaim any claim under this chapter
arising out of the transaction on which suit is brought.

HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 19; 1983, ch. 58, § 9; 1993, ch. 4, § 56; 1995, ch. 198, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
CITED in Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
TREATISES. -Thomas and Backman, Utah Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), § 5.08(c)
(5).
A.L.R. —Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action, 44 A.L.R.4th 776.
Liability for delay in making repair of motor vehicle, 44 A.L.R.4th 1174.
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article, part, chapter, subtitle, or title.
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LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. S&M CENTRAL SERVICE CORPORATION,
Defendant.

No. 03 C 4986
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN

DIVISION
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22563
November 5, 2004, Decided
November 8, 2004, Docketed
DISPOSITION: Judgment entered for plaintiff. Plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction
granted; Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and Motion to
Strike S&M's Brief on Damages denied.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff the owner of five trademarks related to its cigarette
products, brought post trial motions, seeking: an award of statutory damages of $
500,000, pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 1117(c); an award of its costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 1117(b); a permanent injunction barring
defendant infringer from selling, offering for sale or distributing counterfeit cigarettes,
and, amendment of to add individual defendants.
OVERVIEW: The complaint alleged that the infringers violated the Trademark Act of
1946, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1051 et seq., by willfully offering for sale, selling, and distributing
counterfeit versions of the owner's Newport cigarettes. A jury found that consumers
would likely confuse the counterfeits with genuine Newports, and the infringing
corporation had acted willfully or with willful blindness. The owner also challenged
financial data in the form of tax returns submitted by the infringing corporation as
improper. The tax forms were not a pleading, and actually showed real profits for the tax
years, and so were not prejudicial to the owner, so the motion to strike was denied. The
court noted that the five trademarks infringed were of considerable value. Since part of
the purpose of statutory damages was to deter the current violator and other potential
future violators, actual damages were less relevant and statutory damages were
appropriate. The court found that a $ 250,000 award was fully supported by its
concurrence with the jury's determination. The owner also sought to add, after the fact,
two individual officers of the infringer as defendants to conform to the evidence.
OUTCOME: The court awarded statutory damages of $ 50,000 per infringed mark,
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and a permanent injunction. The motion to amend
the pleadings to conform to the evidence adding two individuals as defendants was
denied.
CORE TERMS: counterfeit, cigarette, infringement, trademark, infringed, willful, statutory
damage, dollar, brand, reproduction, imitation, carton, actual damages, packaging, genuine,
conform, selling, amend, likely to cause, evidence presented, motion to strike, willfulness,
offering, deter, consumer products, damage award, deceive, counterfeiter, distributing,
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COUNSEL: [*1] For LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
Plaintiff: John S. Pacocha, Jeffrey G. Mote, Daniel T Fahner, Cameron Matthew Nelson,
Greenberg Traurig, LLP., Chicago, IL.
For S&M CENTRAL SERVICE CORPORATION, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION, Defendant:
Alexander Sotirios Michalakos, Zanayed & Michalakos, Ltd., Chicago, IL.
JUDGES: JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, District Judge.
OPINIONBY: JAMES F. HOLDERMAN
OPINION: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Lorillard Tobacco Co., ("Lorillard"), filed suit against defendant S&M Central Service
Corporation, ("S&M"), alleging that S&M infringed of five of Lorillard's registered trademarks
in violation of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., ("Lanham Act"), by
willfully, or with willful blindness, offering for sale, selling and distributing counterfeit
versions of Lorillard's Newport cigarettes. At the conclusion of a two day trial on the merits, a
jury returned a verdict in favor of Lorillard and stated: (1) yes, consumers would likely
confuse the cigarette packs bearing the counterfeit marks sold by S&M with genuine Newport
cigarette packs; and (2) yes, S&M's actions were [*2] taken willfully or committed with
willful blindness. (Dkt. No. 49.)
Lorillard's August 4, 2004 post-trial motions request this court to (1) award Lorillard
statutory damages of five hundred thousand dollars, ($ 500,000) n l , pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
1117(c); (2) award Lorillard costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
1117(b); (3) enter a permanent injunction barring S&M from selling, offering for sale or
distributing counterfeit cigarettes, and, (4) amend the pleadings to add Safwan Alkhawan
("Alkhawan") and Marwan Khawam ("Khawam") as individually liable defendants in order to
conform the pleadings to the evidence presented at trial. Lorillard also submitted a motion on
August 16, 2004 to Strike the Defendant's Brief on Damages pursuant to Rules 12, 26 and 3Z
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ("Rules").
-

Footnotes

-

n l Lorillard arrived at the $ 500,000 figure by requesting damages of one hundred thousand
dollars, ($ 100,000), for each of the five infringed trademarks.
End Footnotes

[*3]

S&M, in its Brief Regarding Damages of August 6, 2004, requests that if any damages are
awarded, the court should award 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)'s minimum amount of $ 500 per
infringed mark for a total award of $ 2,500. S&M also argues that an award of attorneys' fees
and costs is not appropriate in this case.
For the reasons set forth below, this court awards to Lorillard, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117
(c), statutory damages of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 50,000) per infringed mark for a total
statutory damage award of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 250,000). This court also

finds that Lorillard is entitled to receive reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to 15
U.S.C. 5 1117(b) but the parties must comply with the requirements of Local Rule 54.3
before this court can calculate a figure for reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. In addition,
this court grants Lorillard's request for a permanent injunction, but denies Lorillard's Motion
to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and denies Lorillard's August 16, 2004
Motion to Strike S&M's Brief on Damages.
BACKGROUND
A. Lorillard Tobacco Company [ * 4 ]
Lorillard is the fourth largest tobacco company in the United States. (Stipulation and
Statement of Uncontested Facts P 4, Ex. 1 to the Pre-Trial Order, [hereinafter Uncontested
Facts].) First introduced into the market in 1956, Newport is a Lorillard cigarette brand. (Id.
at P 6.) Newport is the leading brand of menthol cigarettes sold in the United States, and it is
the second leading cigarette brand overall with an eight percent market share. (Id. at P 6-7.)
Lorillard has protected the value of the Newport brand by registering the five following
trademarks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Reg. No. 1,108,876; Reg.
No. 1,178,413; Reg. No. 1,191,816; Reg. No. 1,920,066; and Reg. No. 2,600,870. (Id. at P
10.) Four of the marks, Nos. 1,108,876; 1,178,417; 1,191,816; and 1,920,666, have
attained incontestable status under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). (Id.)
B. S&M Central Service Corporation and its interaction with Lorillard
S&M operates a gas station in Chicago, Illinois. (Trial Tr. pg. 59.) The station sells gasoline,
operates maintenance bays, and sells consumer products including food, magazines and
cigarettes. (Uncontested [*5] Facts at P 3.) Lorillard became aware of counterfeit Newport
cigarettes at S&M when one of Lorillard's sales representatives made a sales call to S&M. (Id.
at 16.) The sales representative purchased two cartons of the counterfeit cigarettes. (Trial Tr.
at 42.) On July 18, 2003, Lorillard obtained an Ex Parte Seizure Order from this court
authorizing a seizure of counterfeit cigarettes at S&M. The executed search of S&M resulted
in a seizure of 83 cartons and 9 packages of counterfeit Newport cigarettes and associated
business records.
ANALYSIS
A. Lorillard's Motion to Strike S&M's Brief on Damages
On August 16, 2004, Lorillard filed a motion to strike S&M's August 6, 2004 brief on damages
under Rules 12, 26, and 37. Lorillard's motion asserts two separate concerns. First, Lorillard
argues that S&M's brief contains misstatement of facts unsupported by citation to the record.
Second, Lorillard argues that S&M improperly included its 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax returns
as an exhibit to S&M's brief on damages. Lorillard argues that it had requested financial
information included tax returns from S&M during discovery, that S&M had failed to disclose
these items, and therefore [*6] S&M should be prohibited from using these documents
under Rule 37. Lorillard requests the court to strike S&M's brief in whole, or in the alternative
strike specific offending portions of the brief, and the impose sanctions against S&M.
S&M counters that the documents provided with its brief were specifically requested by the
court at the end of the trial, that these documents were not disclosed during discovery
because they were not relevant and the information contained in the brief is appropriate
since S&M is making arguments to the court. S&M further argues that Lorillard should be
sanctioned for bringing its motion to strike.
Lorillard is unable to bring a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). Rule 12(f) provides that"* 1 "? 1

"the court may strike from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The plain language of
Rule 12(f) states that the Rule applies to "pleadings." HN2lrA memorandum submitted in
support of a court's determination of damages is not a pleading under the Rules. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7(a) (Defining pleadings as either a complaint, answer, reply to a counterclaim, an
answer to a cross-claim, [ * 7 ] a third-party complaint, or third-party answer); see, e.g.,
E.E.O.C. v. Admiral Maint. Serv., LP., 174 F.R.D. 643, 645-47 (N.D. III. 1997).
Consequently, by the plain language of Rules, Rule 12(f) is not applicable. The court notes,
however, that any evaluation of the facts must be based on the record presented to the court
and the court will provide proper citations to the record were appropriate.
Furthermore, this court concludes that it will consider the tax returns provided by S&M in its
brief on damages. H/V3"?The language of Rule 37(c) allows a court to consider evidence that
otherwise would be excluded when the result is harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). In this case,
the court concludes that S&M*s decision to provide its 2001, 2003 and 2003 tax returns was
harmless to Lorillard and actually undercuts certain of S&M's arguments due to the way that
S&M uses the tax returns in its brief on damages.
S&M provides its tax returns as support for its statement that "S&M has not been a profitable
enterprise. The attached tax returns of 2001, 2002, and 2003 show that there was no
taxable income to the company. As a result, any award of damages would cause a hardship
to the [*8] Defendant." (Def. Br. Regarding Damages of August 6, 2004 at 3.) However, the
information contained in the tax returns contradict the statement that any award of damages
would be a hardship. It is true that S&M reported zero taxable income on its 2001, 2002 and
2003 federal tax returns. However, the zero taxable figure was the result of a Net Operating
Loss deduction, ("NOL"), that S&M was able to take during those three years. H N 4 ^ A NOL is a
non cash deduction that allows a company to "carry-forward" and/or "carry-back" prior year
losses and recognize them as current year deductions. See 26 U.S.C. § 172. Consequently,
S&M's statement that it "has not been a profitable enterprise" may be technically correct for
tax purposes since S&M reported no taxable income. However, the tax returns actually
undermine S&M's statement that "any award of damages would cause a hardship for the
Defendant" because S&M recognized a profit before the NOL deduction. S&M's creditability as
to its statement of financial condition is further undermined by the millions of dollars of wire
transfers uncovered by Lorillard. (Pis. Brief on Damages and Att'ys Fees of August 6, 2004 at
Ex. [ * 9 ] I.) Since the tax returns submitted by S&M are actually harmful to S&M and
helpful to Lorillard, the court concludes there is no harm as to Lorillard and will deny
Lorillard's motion to strike. In light of this decision, S&M's motion to sanction Lorillard for
bringing its motion to strike is denied.
B. Lorillard's Motion for Statutory Damages under 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c)
w/V5

TTitle 15, Section 1117 allows a plaintiff to elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered, one of two alternative recovery options for trademark infringement: (1) the actual
damages caused by the infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); or (2) statutory damages. 15
U.S.C. § 1117(c). Congress provided the statutory damages option of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)
through the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 7,
110 Stat. 1386. This option was added due to the concern that a counterfeiter might hide,
alter or destroy records, thus making it impossible for a plaintiff to determine the scope of, or
be able to prove, actual damages. Louis Vuitton v. Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583 (E.D. Pa.
2002) [ * 1 0 ] (citing S. Rep. No. 177, 104 Cong. (1995)).
Section 1117(c)(1) allows H/V6 7statutory damages of "not less than $ 500 and no more than
$ 100,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or
distributed, as the court considers just." 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c)(1). In addition, " " ^ S e c t i o n
1117(c)(2) allows a statutory award of up to $ 1,000,000 per counterfeit mark "if the court

finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful." 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c)(2)Although section 1117(c) contains the dollar ranges for possible statutory damage awards,
the statute does not provides guidance on how to select a damage figure within statutory
dollar range. Courts interpreting section 1117(c) have looked by analogy to case law applying
the statutory damage provision of the Copyright Act contained in 17 U.S.C. 5 504(c). Sara
Lee v. Bags of New York, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Cases decided
under the Copyright Act, which deals with a similar problem and a similar legislative grant to
discretion, afford guidance here."). Accord, Tommy Hilfiqer Licensing, Inc. v. Goody's [ * 1 1 ]
Family Clothing, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8788, No. 1:00-CV-1934-BBM, 2003 WL
22331254, at *28(N.D. Ga. May 9, 2003); Louis Vuitton, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Microsoft
Corp. v. Logical Choice Computers, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 479, No. 99 C 1300, 2001 WL
58950 at * 11 (N.D. III. Jan. 22, 2001); , Microsoft Corp. v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc.,
129 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1008 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
The Seventh Circuit's standard for awarding copyright statutory damages under 17 U.S.C §
504(c), and thus the standard this court will use for awarding trademark statutory damages
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), is enumerated in Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club. 930 F.2d 1224,
1229 (7th Cir. 1991). Under the Chi-Boy standard, Hyv *7a court awarding statutory damages
is "not required to follow any rigid formula but instead enjoys wide discretion." Id. In
computing the award amount, a court may consider factors such as "the difficulty or
impossibility of proving actual damages, the circumstances of the infringement, and the
efficacy of the damages as a deterrent." Id. Additionally, statutory damages are appropriate
to "penalize [ * 1 2 ] the infringer and deter future violations" when the infringement was
willful. Id. at 1230.
Lorillard argues for a damages award of at least $ 100,000 per each of the five infringed
marks for a minimum damage award of $ 500,000. Lorillard argues that the $ 500,000 is
appropriate in light of (1) S&M's annual total gross sales of approximately $ 1.35 million, (2)
S&M's annual total gross sales of cigarettes of $ 300,000, (3) the "immeasurable value" of
Lorillard's trademarks and the risk that customers using inferior counterfeit cigarettes will
stop buying Newport products, and, (4) will serve to deter both S&M and other potential
infringers. (Pis. Brief on Damages and Att'ys Fees of August 6, 2004 at pg 12-13, 18.) In
addition, Lorillard argues that the court should reject any of the S&M's arguments about
inability to pay a damages award. According to Lorillard, S&M's financial information should
be "viewed with a healthy degree of skepticism," since they have failed to provide supporting
documentation and Lorillard uncovered "millions of dollars worth of foreign wire transfers"
made by S&M. (Id. at 13.)
Lorillard also argues for the court to find that S&M was [ * 1 3 ] willful in its infringement. A
finding of willful infringement would allow for a damages award of up to $ 1,000,000 per
counterfeit mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2), for a total potential award of $ 5,000,000.
According to Lorillard, evidence of S&M's willfulness include (1) the purchase of larger than
usual quantities of purported Newport cigarettes from Cam-Kat at a price well below market
value and in unusual packaging that differed significantly from the genuine Newport
packaging, and, (2) the jury's verdict finding willful infringement. (Id. at 15.) Additionally,
Lorillard argues that S&M's attempts to rebut the question of willfulness merely highlight
their own guilt," (Id.), and they have exacerbated their willful purchases of counterfeit
Newports by "lying throughout this case - from the day of the ex parte seizure to the last day
of trial." (Id. at 16.)
S&M argues the court should impose no damages or at the most the minimum statutory
penalty of $ 500 per infringed mark for a total award of $ 2,500. S&M argues that (1) the
conduct of defendants in other reported infringement cases is more willful and done with
more disdain than in this [ * 1 4 ] case, and therefore warranted higher damages, (Defs. Brief
Regarding Damages of August 6, 2004 at pg 2); (2) S&M has not been a profitable enterprise

and therefore any damage award would cause a hardship, (Id.); (3) the actual damage to
Lorillard was very small due to the small number of cartons of counterfeit product purchased,
(Id. at 4.); (4) despite the jury's finding of willfulness, the evidence for willfulness was not
overwhelming, (Id.); (5) Lorillard shares some level of responsibility since it possessed
specialized and sophisticated knowledge about how to identify counterfeit packages and
never shared this information with S&M, (Id. at 5); and, (6) the court should not be bound
by the jury's findings. (Id. at 6)
This court concludes that the appropriate damage award in this case is $ 50,000 per infringed
mark for a total statutory damages award of $ 250,000. This amount is appropriate due to
the value of the trademarks, the conduct by S&M, and the need to deter future conduct by
S&M and other potential counterfeiters. Furthermore, this court notes that an award of $
250,000 is reasonable and fair in light of the range of awards provided by other
courts [ * 1 5 ] awarding damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) n2, and that the total potential
award could have been as high as $ 5,000,000 due to the maximum statutory award of $
1,000,000 for each willfully infringed trademark.
Footnotes
n2 A figure of $ 50,000 per infringed mark for a total award of $ 250,000 is within the range
of statutory awards made by other courts under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). See Philip Morris USA,
Inc. v. Felizardo, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11154, No. 03 Civ. 5891, 2004 WL 1375277, at *7
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2004) ($ 62,500 statutory damage award for two infringed
trademarks when defendant attempted to sell 7500 counterfeit cartons of cigarettes); Philip
Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (CD. Cal. 2003) ($
2,000,000 statutory damage award for two infringed trademarks when defendant imported
8,000,000 counterfeit cigarettes); see e.g., Silhouette Int'l Schmied v. Chakhbazian, No. 04
Civ. 3613, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 4, 2004) ($ 250,000 statutory damage award for infringement
of multiple eyewear trademarks); Microsoft Corp v. V3 Solutions, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15008, No. 01 C 4693, 2003 WL 22038593, at *16 (N.D. III. Aug. 28, 2003) ($ 35,000
statutory damage award for seven infringed Microsoft software trademarks); Microsoft Corp.
v. Logical Choice Computers, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 479, No. 99 C 1300, 2001 WL
58950, at *11 (N.D. III. Jan. 22, 2001) ($ 1,400,000 statutory damage for the infringement
of seven Microsoft software trademarks).

End Footnotes
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The five trademarks infringed by S&M are of considerable worth and value. Lorillard has
taken considerable action to cultivate, maintain and strengthen these trademarks including:
(1) registering the trademarks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
(Uncontested Facts at P 8); (2) manufacturing the Newport product through strict quality
control standards, (Id. at P 5); (3) investing substantial time, energy and money in
advertising and promoting the Newport product (Id. at P 6); (4) training its sales personnel
to be aware of counterfeit products so, like in this case, they can identify and report
suspicious items, (Trial Tr. at pg 33.); and, (5) protecting the value of its trademarks by
litigating against trademark infringers.
Congress has provided the option of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c) and
Lorillard has elected to pursue that remedy. Consequently, the significant value of Lorillard's
brand and the efforts taken to protect, promote and enhance that brand should be
considered by the court in the determination of the appropriate dollar figure for the award.
Furthermore, the actual damages incurred by Lorillard are of [ * 1 7 ] lesser concern in
determining a proper damage award because Congress' decision to allow statutory damages
under 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c) was in direct recognition of the fact that the calculation of the

actual damages may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Louis Vuitton v. Veit, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 567f 583 fE.D. Pa. 2002) (citing S. Rep. No. 177, 104 Cong. (1995)).
The actual damages figure is also less relevant since part of the purpose of statutory
damages is to deter the current violator and other potential future violators. Thus, the court
believes that a damage award limited to Lorillard's lost profits would have little to no
deterrent effect on future violations. HN9+A counterfeiter must fear more than just having to
turn over his ill gotten gains to the rightful owners. Instead, the counterfeit must understand
that he risks his financial future by engaging in his illegal practice. As the Seventh Circuit has
held, "one who undertakes a course of infringing conduct may neither sneer in the face of the
[trademark] owner nor hide its head in the sand like an ostrich." Wildlife Express Corp. v.
Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502r 514 (7th Cir. 1994) [*18] (citations omitted).
Furthermore, deterring S&M along with potential future trademark infringers is an important
consideration in light of the fact that counterfeiters often times produces lower quality
products than the original. Lorillard properly notes that infringement deprives the rightful
owner of profits and reduces the value of its brands. But an additional concern, above and
beyond the financial harm, is that counterfeit consumer products can also potentially pose
the risk of being more harmful or dangerous then the real product. The House of
Representatives in its report on the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-153, § 7, 110 Stat. 1386, noted, "even more grievous than the enormous
economic losses suffered by American companies are the serious health and safety hazards
caused by criminal counterfeiting." H. Rep. No. 556, 104 Cong. (1996).
The court is not entering into a discussion of the general health effects of cigarettes or
whether the counterfeit cigarettes sold by S&M were more harmful than the authentic
Newport product. Instead, the court is noting that there was no proof presented by the
parties that the counterfeit Newport products [ * 1 9 ] are subject to any type of safety review
or quality control process when manufactured by someone other than Lorillard. Cigarettes
are consumer products and the retail establishments that sell cigarettes often sell other
consumer products such as food, beverages, over-the-counter medicines and cosmetics. S&M
sells food and beverages as well as cigarettes. (Uncontested Facts at P 3.) The statutory
damage award will deter S&M and other retail establishments from purchasing counterfeit
consumer products, and this in turn will help to reduce the probability that consumers will
purchase counterfeit products that may be more dangerous than the authentic items.
The court's belief that a $ 250,000 award is fully supported by its concurrence with the jury's
determination of S&M's willful infringement. A finding of willful infringement allows the court
to award the maximum statutory damage amount, if appropriate under the circumstances of
the case, of $ 1,000,000 per infringed mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), for a total potential award
in this case of $ 5,000,000.
/yyvi0 ,|l

7 Willful infringement may be attributed to the defendant's actions where he had
knowledge that his conduct constituted [ * 2 0 ] infringement or where he showed a reckless
disregard for the owner's rights. Thus, knowledge need not be proved directly, but can be
inferred from a defendant's conduct." Logical Choice Computers, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
479, No. 99 C 1300, 2001 WL 58950, at *11 (citing Wildlife Express Corp., 18 F.3d at 511).
Willful infringement may be shown by the fact that the "defendant ignored the plaintiff's
notices ..., did not seek advice of an attorney, and passed the matter off as a nuisance."
Wildlife Express Corp., 18 F.3d at 511.
Several facts support the jury's determination of willfulness. S&M purchased the counterfeit
cigarettes at a price below the market price. Khawam testified that S&M obtained the
counterfeit cigarettes at a price of $ 34 per carton instead of the normal rate of $ 40 per
carton. (Trial Tr. 155, 161.) Khawam admitted during his testimony that price was low
enough to make him inspect the tax stamps and the name brands on a sample of the cartons

he purchased for Cam-Kat. (Trial Tr. 160.)
Additionally evidence is that packaging for the counterfeit cigarettes, including the outer
boxes, was different from the packaging used for authentic [ * 2 1 ] Newport cigarettes. (Trial
Ex. 30 - 32c.) Alkawham, when questioned about the differences in the packaging during his
testimony, responded, "it's not my business to find out if they're counterfeit or not." (Trial Tr.
91.)
In light of the reasons set forth above, this court awards to Lorillard, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5
1117(c), statutory damages of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 50,000) per infringed mark for a
total statutory damage award of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 250,000). This
amount is within the range authorized by Congress under the statute and is appropriate in
light of the evidence presented at trial.
C. Award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(b) and Rule
54(d)(1)
Lorillard seeks an award of $ 140,000 for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. HNllm+As the
prevailing party, Lorillard is entitled to its costs other than attorneys' fees as a matter of
course pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). " ^ ^ " T h e court in exceptional
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
Exceptional cases allowing for an award of [ * 2 2 ] attorneys' fees include "acts of
infringement [that] are 'malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful."' BASF Corp. v. Old World
Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081, 1099 f7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.,
Inc.. 886 F.2d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 1989)),
An award of reasonable attorneys's fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) is appropriate in light of
the jury's determination, and the court's concurrence in that determination, of willful
infringement by S&M. The parties must comply with the Local Rule 54.3, before the court can
determine the amount of fees and costs which reasonably should be awarded.
D. Permanent Injunction Barring S&M from Selling, Offering for Sale or Distributing
Counterfeit Cigarettes
Lorillard seeks a permanent injunction to bar S&M from selling, offering for sale or
distributing counterfeit cigarettes. HN13TTh\s court has power to enter such an injunction,
"according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem
reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the
Patent and Trademark Office." 15 U.S.C. § 1116 [ * 2 3 ] (a). This court grants the injunction,
as detailed below, in the "Conclusion" section of this opinion.
E. Lorillard's Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Presented at Trial
Lorillard moves to amend the pleadings to add Safwan Alkhawan, ("Alkhawam"), and Marwan
Khawam ("Khawam") as individually liable defendants in order to conform the pleadings to
the evidence presented at trial pursuant to Rule 15(b). Alkhawan is the owner of S&M. (Trial
at pg. 58.) Alkhawan handles S&M's financial activities including its bank accounts, the
paying of bills and the writing of checks. (Trial Tr.pg 60.) Alkhawan has employed his brother
Khawam to run the gas station on a daily basis for the past ten years. (Id.)
/y/vi4-yAs a g e n e r a | r u | e / corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for infringing
actions taken by the corporation. Drink Group, Inc. v. Gulfstream Communications, 7 F.
Supp. 2d 1009, 1010 (N.D. III. 1998) (citing Dangler v. Imperial Mach. Co., 11 F.2d 945, 947
(7th Cir. 1926)). However, this court has recognized that an individual may be held liable for
a corporation's infringement under the theory of vicarious liability or [ * 2 4 ] contributory

liability. Microsoft Corp. v. V3 Solutions, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15008, No. 01 C 4693,
2003 WL 22038593, at *13 (N.D. III. Aug. 28, 2003) (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971)). "Personal liability for trademark
infringement... is established if a corporate officer is a moving, active, conscious force
behind the defendant corporation's infringement." Dynamic Force v. Dynamic Force, Ltd.,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7892, No. 98 C 5922, 1999 WL 342407, at *4 (N.D. III. May 14,
1999).
The factual situation in the present case is different from the situation in the V3 Solutions
and Dynamic Force cases. In those cases, the individual corporate officer had been named as
a defendant in the original complaint filed with the court. Thus, the question was whether it
was appropriate to find personal liability or only limit liability to the named corporation.
However, in the present case, Alkhawan and Khawam have never been named as defendants
in the case. Service of process was only effectuated on S&M, not on Alkhawan or Khawam.
(Dkt. No. 14.) The U.S. Marshall's served Khawam in person on July 18, 2003, however,
Khawam was served [ * 2 5 ] in his role as an employee of S&M and not in his capacity as an
individual. (Dkt. No. 13.)
H/VI5

Trhis court does have the ability under Rule 15 to add new defendants after trial and
judgment has been entered. However, as the Supreme Court held in Nelson v. Adams, that if
the court adds a new party to the litigation, due process requires that the new party is given
an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability. 529 U.S. 460, 463, 146 L. Ed. 2d
530, 120 S. Ct- 1579 (2000). Thus, this court, although it has the power to add Alkhawan
and Khawam, cannot immediately award judgment against them in favor of Lorillard.
Instead, if this court decides to add Alkhawan and Khawam, it must give them the
opportunity to respond.
Furthermore, H/VI6 "?although Rule 15 provides a liberal policy for amending pleadings, the
right to amend is not absolute. See Crestview Vill. Apartments v. United States Dep't of
Hous. and Urban Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 2004 WL 1965663, at *5 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Perkins
v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1991)). Lorillard provides no reason for its
failure to name Alkhawan and Khawam as individual defendants [ * 2 6 ] before the trial.
Lorillard was aware of Alkhawan and Khawam existence and their roles in the counterfeiting
before the trial. Alkhawan was present for this trial, however, his presence was in his
capacity as the owner of S&M. Whether he and Khawam would have dealt with this case in
the same way as S&M, if they were facing personal liability and a possible judgment against
them as individuals, is a matter of speculation. The only way to know would be to retry the
case and the court is unwilling at this point to impose to undertake that burden especially
when Lorillard could have named Alkhawan and Khawam as defendants much earlier in the
litigation. Consequently, the court denies Lorillard's motion to amend the pleadings to
conform to the evidence presented at trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this court order judgment to Plaintiff Lorillard Tobacco
Company of statutory damages of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($ 50,000) per infringed mark for a
total statutory damage award, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(c), of Two Hundred and Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($ 250,000) from Defendant S&M Central Service Corporation. This court
also finds that Lorillard [ * 2 7 ] Tobacco Company is entitled to receive reasonable costs and
attorneys' fees from S&M Central Service Corporation, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(b), but
the parties must comply with the requirements of Local Rule 54.3 as follows: Lorillard must
provide S&M with its 54.3 material by November 12, 2004 and S&M must provide Lorillard
with its 54.3 material by November 23, 2004. The parties should then attempt to resolve any
remaining disputes over attorneys' fees and costs. If an agreement cannot be reached,
Lorillard's further petition for fees and costs, including the joint statement under 54.3(e), is
due no later than December 6, 2004. Response is due December 17, 2004 and the reply is

December 28, 2004.
This court denies Lorillard's Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence and
denies Lorillard's August 16, 2004 Motion to Strike S&M's Brief on Damages.
The court orders the clerk of this court to release the five hundred dollar ($ 500) bond posted
by Lorillard Tobacco Company at the commencement of this action on July 18, 2003, plus
interest, be immediately released to Martin Kedziora or Thomas Kost in a check payable to
Greenberg Traurig, LLP. [ * 2 8 ]
Furthermore, it is therefore ordered that defendant S&M Central Service Corporation, and
their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those personal or entities in active concert
or participating with them who receive actual notice of this order by personal service or
otherwise, are permanently enjoined from doing, or assisting others in doing, the following
acts:
(i) using any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of the
Lorillard Marks in connection with the importation, sale, offering for sale, or
distribution of cigarettes in the United States, which cigarettes in fact are not
connected with Lorillard or are not genuine Lorillard products, which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;
(ii) using the Lorillard Marks or any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of the same in any manner likely to cause others to believe that
Defendants' products are connected with Lorillard or are genuine Lorillard
products if they are not, which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive;
(iii) passing off, inducing, or enabling others to sell or pass off any merchandise
which is [ * 2 9 ] not genuine Lorillard merchandise as and for genuine Lorillard
merchandise;
(iv) committing any other acts reasonably calculated to cause purchasers to
believe that Defendant's products are Lorillard's products, when in fact such
products are not Lorillard products;
(v) importing, shipping, delivering, distributing, holding for sale, returning,
transferring, or otherwise moving or disposing of in any manner such cigarettes
falsely bearing one or more of the Lorillard Marks or any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of the same;
(vi) discussing or communicating any aspect of the seizure of counterfeit
cigarettes or the identifying markers of counterfeit cigarettes with any person or
entity selling or attempting to sell cigarettes to Defendants;
(vii) assisting, aiding, or abetting any other person or business entity in engaging
in or performing any of the activities referred to in the above paragraphs (i)
through (vi); and (viii) other than by an order of this Court,
(1) selling, moving, destroying, or otherwise disposing of any goods,
boxes, labels, packaging or other items or documents bearing any
reproduction, counterfeit, or imitation of the Lorillard [ * 3 0 ] Marks,
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive;
(2) moving, destroying, or otherwise disposing of any business
records or documents relating in any way to the manufacture,
importation, acquisition, purchase, distribution, or sale of goods or
merchandise bearing any of the Lorillard Marks or any reproduction,
counterfeit, or imitation of the Lorillard Marks, which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(3) assisting any third party in identifying, moving, destroying, or

otherwise disposing of any reproduction, counterfeit or imitation
goods, as well as any records pertaining to reproduction, counterfeit
or imitation goods, which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.

S&M Central Service Corporation and their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those
personal or entities in active concert or participating with them who receive actual notice of
this order by personal service or otherwise is warned that any act by them in violation of any
of the terms of this Order may be considered and prosecuted as contempt of this Court.
ENTER:
JAMES F. HOLDERMAN
United [ * 3 1 ] States District Judge
DATE: November 5, 2004
JUDGMENT I N A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came to trial before the Court. The issues have been tried and
a decision has been rendered.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant in the amount of $ 250,000.00 plus costs and attorneys' fees.
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Before the court was plaintiff photographer's motion for
summary judgment and defendant music hall center's cross-motion for summary
judgment on the photographer's lawsuit that alleged a copyright infringement in the
music hall center's use of a photograph taken by the photographer.
OVERVIEW: The photographer had taken a picture of Dizzy Gillespie that he had
donated to the museum. With the museum's permission, the music hall center used the
photograph as a program cover for the Montreaux Detroit Jazz Festival. The
photographer filed a lawsuit against the music hall center alleging a copyright
infringement in the use of the Dizzy Gillespie photograph. Both the photographer and the
music hall center filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary
judgment to the photographer. The photographer was not required to mark the donated
print with the copyright symbol to protect his ownership because his gift to the museum
was not a transfer of copyright ownership. Although the Copyright Act barred an action
for infringement without registration, the photographer effectively cured the deficiency
by registering the copyright before or within five years of its publication, as provided by
17 U.S.C.S. 5 410(c). The photographer was entitled to actual damages that could be
attributed to the music hall center's infringing activity.
OUTCOME: The court granted the photographer's motion for summary judgment on his
lawsuit that alleged a copyright infringement in the music hall center's use of a
photograph taken by the photographer.
CORE TERMS: photograph, summary judgment, registration, infringer, infringement,
copyright infringement, actual damages, museum, display, notice, gift, moving party,
registered, ownership, register, publicly, infringement of copyright, cross-motion, distributed,
copyrighted, modified, donated, print, nonmoving party, matter of law, infringing, innocent,
cured, effective date, reasons stated
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±Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a m a t t e r of law. More Like This Headnote
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Summary Judgment Standard %M

"A^iThe test for the grant of a motion for summary judgment is that the substantive
law will identify which facts are material, and only disputes over facts that may
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment. Thus, factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be considered. To meet this standard, the moving party need
not support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials "negating" the
opponents claim. The burden on the moving party may be discharged by
demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party's case. Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden passes to the
non-moving party to establish, after an adequate opportunity for discovery, the
existence of a disputed factual element essential to his or her case with respect to
which he or she bears the burden of proof. Where the record taken as a whole
cannot lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, the motion for
summary judgment should be granted. More Like This Headnote
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Copyright Law > Publication > General Overview 1*J3

"^iSection 401(a) of the Copyright Act, as modified, provides in part: (a) General
Provision.-Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United
States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright may
be placed on publicly distributed copies from which the work can be visually
perceived. 17 U.S.C.S. § 4 0 1 ( a ) .

More Like This Headnote

Copyright Law > Publication > Copyright Act of 1909 ym
Copyright Law > Publication > Copyright Act of 1976 ™3
HN4

± Publication is defined as the distribution of copies of a work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to
distribute copies to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or
display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. 17 U.S.C.S. §
101.
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±To perform or display a work publicly means: (1) to perform or display it at a place
open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of
a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered. 17 U.S.C.S. 5
101(1).
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±Registration is a condition precedent to bringing an action for copyright
infringement. 17 U.S.C.S. § 411(a). Failure to register a copyright before
publication of the work may be cured, thus allowing the copyright owner to bring
suit, by registration before or within five years of the first publication of the work,
and constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright and of the facts stated in the
certificate. 17 U.S.C.S. § 410(c). The work need not be published to be registered.
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±Remedies for copyright infringement are provided by § 504(a) of the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C.S. § 504(a). It makes the infringer liable for either (1) the copyright
owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by
subsection (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection
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±Statutory damages are not available to plaintiff for (1) any infringement of
copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the effective date of its
registration; or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication
of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration
is made within three months after the first publication of the work. 17 U.S.C.S. §
412.
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± Where a plaintiff fails to register his copyrights before the infringement, statutory
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±Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act explicitly provides for the transfer of copyright
ownership. It states: (a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by
operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or
memorandum of the transfer, is in a writing signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent. 17 U.S.C.S. 5 204
(a)-
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COUNSEL: [ * 1 ] FOR RUSS MARSHALL, plaintiff: Barbara M. Cash, Southfield, ML
FOR MUSIC HALL CENTER FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS, INCORPORATED, defendant: David
M. Gaskin, Dahlberg, Mallender, Birmingham, ML
JUDGES; John Corbett O'Meara, United States District Judge
OPINIONBY: John Corbett O'Meara
OPINION: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND FACTS
Plaintiff, Russ Marshall, is a professional photographer who, on September 1, 1993, gave the
Graystone International Jazz Museum in Detroit one copy each of 37 photographs he had
taken of "local and national jazz musicians and singers." n l Each of the donated photographs
was inscribed on the back with the photographer's "inventory notations;" however, none of
the pictures carried the copyright symbol or other notation of copyright. In the group was a
photograph Plaintiff had taken in 1980 of Dizzy Gillespie, he asserts two prints of the

photograph were made; one was donated to the museum and the second was kept for his
own records. n2 In 1994 the Music Hall Center for the Performing Arts took over sponsorship
of the Montreaux Detroit Jazz Festival and used, with the museum's consent, the
plaintiff's [*2] Dizzy Gillespie photograph as the program's cover. n3 While there is some
dispute over the number of programs printed, several thousand of them were distributed to
concert goers from September 1-5, 1994.
Footnotes

n l Defendant's brief, exhibit 1. The deed of gift, "gift agreement," as signed by Plaintiff
states: "I hereby give and deliver to the Graystone International Jazz Museum the property
described herein." The property is described only as 37 11 x 14 inch black + white
photographs."
n2 Id. at 3.
n3Id.
End Footnotes
On November 4, 1994 Plaintiff registered the photograph with the United States Copyright
Office, offering September 1, 1994 as the date of first publication of the work. At issue
between the parties is whether Mr. Marshall's interest in his photograph was copyright
protected prior to its registration and if so, the damages to which he is entitled in light of
Defendant's use of it. The parties agree that the photograph is a form of intellectual property
subject to copyright, that the gift to the museum [*3] does not constitute "publication" of
the photograph and that once the work was registered Mr. Marshall's interest in excluding
others from publishing his work is protected.
On March 7, 1995, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging copyright infringement as Count I. n4
Plaintiff filed his motion for summary judgment on August 28, 1995; Defendant filed its
cross-motion for summary judgment as a response on September 28, 1995. Oral argument
on the motions was heard on October 26, 1995, and the motions taken under advisement.
The court now grants Plaintiff's motion for the reasons stated on the record and below.
Footnotes
n4 Count I I for conversion, a state law claim, was dismissed by court order on April 7, 1995.
End Footnotes
APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard of Review: Summary Judgment
As interpreted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, H/VI: Fsummary
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there [ * 4 ] is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Pitts v.
Miller Car Rental, 942 F.2d 1067, 1069 (6th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). Citing the

trio of cases which defined the standards and burdens to be met by the parties in a motion
for summary judgment, n5 the Court of Appeals posits H/V2:Fthe test for the grant of a motion
for summary judgment as follows:

the substantive law will identify which facts are material . . . only disputes over
facts which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Thus, factual disputes which
are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be considered. To meet this standard, the
moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other similar
materials "negating" the opponents claim. The burden on the moving party may
be discharged by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party's case. Once the moving party meets this burden, the
burden passes to the nonmoving party to establish, after an adequate
opportunity for discovery, the existence of a disputed factual element [*5]
essential to his or her case with respect to which he or she bears the burden of
proof. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment should be
granted.

Id. at 1069-70.
Footnotes
n5 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202r 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) f
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) and
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct.
1348 (1986).

End Footnotes-

B. Copyright Infringement
In 1976 and again in 1988, the Copyright Act, Title 17 of the United States Code, was
extensively modified. Under the current statute, federal copyright protection attaches to a
work immediately upon its creation, and, for works published after March 1, 1989, is not
forfeited by the creator's failure to attach notice of copyright to it. H/V3"?Section 401 of the
Act, as modified, provides in pertinent part:

(a) General [*6] Provision.-Whenever a work protected under this title is
published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner,
a notice of copyright. . . may be placed on publicly distributed copies from which
the work can be visually perceived.

17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (emphasis added). n6
Footnotes
n6 The statute formerly provided that notice of copyright "shall be placed on all publicly
distributed copies."
Effective March 1, 1989 the statute was further modified in order to conform with the Berne
Convention. Because copyright notice is optional for works created after February 1989, the
"innocent infringer" defense is available only for works for which there was public distribution
prior to March 1, 1989. Bryce & Palazzola Architects & Assoc, v. A.M.E. Group, Inc., 865 F.
Supp. 401, 404, (1994).
End Footnotes
The statute defines "^^'publication" as the
the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering [*7] to distribute
copies . . . to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or
display of a work does not of itself constitute publication. n7

Id. § 101. Although the "statutory definition under the current Act does not explicitly require
that the 'distribution of copies' . . . be made under the authority of the copyright owner" it is
"undoubtedly implied. Congress could not have intended that the various legal consequences
of publication under the current Act would be triggered by the unauthorized act of an
infringer or other stranger to the copyright." 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, The Law
of Copyright, 5 4.04, at 4-20 (1995).
Footnotes
n7 This allows for personal use or display of the copyrighted work.
End Footnotes
As defined by the statute, H/V5,?to perform or display a work publicly means:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside [*8] of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered;

17 U.S.C. 6 101.
Although according to current law, notice of copyright is not required for protection; HN6
•registration is a condition precedent to bringing an action for copyright infringement. Id. §

411(a). Failure to register a copyright before publication of the work may be "cured," thus
allowing the copyright owner to bring suit, by registration "before or within five years of the
first publication of the work" and constitutes "prima facie evidence of the copyright and of the
facts stated in the certificate." Id. § 410(c). The work need not be published to be registered.
Id. § 408(a) & (b), see Childers v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 983 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983).
H/V7

TRemedies for copyright infringement are provided by section 504(a) of the Act, which
makes the infringer liable for either
(1) the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the
infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).

Statutory damages, n8 which are available to the copyright owner at any time before
judgment, allow [ * 9 ] the court to award plaintiff "a sum of not less than $ 500 or more than
$ 20,000, as the court considers just" for each work infringed. Id. § 504(c)(1). For "willful"
infringement, it is within the court's discretion to increase the statutory damages to $
100,000, alternatively if the court finds the infringer was "not aware and had no reason to
believe that his or her acts constituted infringement of copyright," the court may award
statutory damages of not less than $ 200. Id. § 504(c)(2).
Footnotes
n8 The purpose of statutory damages is to allow relief for copyright infringement where the
calculation of actual damages plus profits is too difficult or would be unfair. The owner's
damages are usually considered the reasonable value the defendant would have given the
plaintiff for the lawful use of the copyrighted work.
End Footnotes
'"^Statutory damages are not, however, available to the plaintiff for

(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the
effective date of its registration; or
(2) [ * 1 0 ] any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of
the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration
is made within three months after the first publication of the work.

Id. § 412. HNgm¥\Nhere a plaintiff fails to register his copyrights before the infringement,
statutory damages and attorney's fees are not available. Fitzgerald Publishing Co. Inc. v.
Baylor Publishing Co., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1133, 1138 (E.D. N.Y. 1987) (citing 17 U.S.C. 5 412
(2)).

0

7Section 204 of the Act explicitly provides for the transfer of copyright ownership:

(a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid
unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is
in writing a signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly
authorized agent.

17 U.S.C. 5 204(a).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff is the creator and copyright owner of his 1980 photograph of Dizzy Gillespie. His gift
to the museum of one print of the photograph as described on the "gift agreement" does not
comport with the statute's requirements for the transfer of copyright ownership, as it does
not license or [*11] otherwise convey any portion of the plaintiff's copyright to the
museum. In making the gift, Mr. Marshall was not required to mark the donated print with
the copyright symbol to protect his ownership. He owned the copyright as soon as the work
was created, and his failure to mark or register the photograph before Defendant's
infringement did not divest him of it. Defendant is incorrect as a matter of law in its assertion
to the contrary. In addition, Defendant may not assert the "innocent infringer" defense, as
publication occurred after March 1, 1989.
Although the statute bars an action for infringement without registration, Mr. Marshall
effectively "cured" that deficiency by registering the copyright "before or within five years of
its first publication," as provided by the Act. He is therefore entitled to actual damages which
can be attributed to the defendant's infringing activity. The "primary measure" for recovery
of actual damages is "based upon the extent to which the market value of the copyrighted
work, at the time of infringement, has been injured. . . . the plaintiff's damages may be said
to equal the profits that the plaintiff might have accrued but for the defendant's [ * 1 2 ]
infringement." 3 Nimmer § 14.02[A] at 14-10.
However, because the copyright was not registered before the infringing activity, plaintiff is
not entitled to statutory damages and/or attorney fees.
ORDER
For the reasons stated on the record at oral argument and above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that Plaintiff's August 28, 1995 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's September 28, 1995 cross-motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Pepe for
determination of Plaintiff's actual damages consistent with this opinion.
John Corbett O'Meara
United States District Judge

Dated: 11/2/95

JUDGMENT
This action came before the Court, Honorable John Corbett O'Meara, District Judge,
presiding, and the issues having been duly heard and a decision having been duly rendered,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
DATED: 11/2/95
APPROVED:
JOHN CORBETT O'MEARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Service:
Citation:
View:
Date/Time:

Get by LEXSEE®
1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17904
Full
Tuesday, June 7, 2005 - 7:05 PM EDT

* Signal Legend:
£ - Warning: Negative treatment is indicated
H | - Questioned: Validity questioned by citing refs
J ^ - Caution: Possible negative treatment
^

- Positive treatment is indicated

0

- Citing Refs. With Analysis Available

0

- Citation information available

* Click on any Shepard's signal to Shepardize® that case.

About LexisNexis | Terms and Conditions

Copyright © 2005 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Tab 10

Service: Get by LEXSEE®
Citation: 2004 UTApp 471

2004 UTApp 471; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 524, *
Amanda Weaver, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. DirectLink Media Group, LLC; and John Does I through X, whose true names are unknown,
Defendants and Appellees.
Case No. 20030947-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2004 UT App 471; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 524
December 16, 2004, Filed
NOTICE: [ * 1 ] THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTER.
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Sandy Department. The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In a class action arising out of the sending and receipt of
unsolicited e-mail, plaintiff recipient, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
appealed a decision of the Third District, Sandy Department (Utah), which dismissed her
action against defendant corporation for lack of jurisdiction.
OVERVIEW: The recipient filed a class action against the corporation because of an
unsolicited e-mail sent by the company to the recipient and others. The trial court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the court reversed and
remanded. The court held that a company that sent or caused one unsolicited,
commercial e-mail to be sent to a resident of Utah transacted business in Utah within the
meaning of the Utah long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. The court also held
that the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case comported with the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
CORE TERMS: email, attenuated, transmission, nonresident, lack of personal jurisdiction,
misgivings, trivial
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes
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Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Jurisdictional Sources 1*J3
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appellate court reviews a trial court's jurisdiction decision for
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±A

company that sends or causes one unsolicited, commercial e-mail to be sent to a
resident of Utah transacts business in Utah within the meaning of the Utah longarm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. The exercise of jurisdiction in such a case
comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

More Like This Headnote

COUNSEL: Daniel Garriott, Denver C. Snuffer Jr., Sandy, and Jesse L Riddle, Draper, for
Appellant.
JUDGES: Norman H. Jackson, Judge. Gregory K. Orme, Judge, Russell W. Bench, Associate
Presiding Judge, Concur.
OPINIONBY: JACKSON
OPINION:
JACKSON, Judge:
The district court dismissed Plaintiff Amanda Weaver's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction;
Weaver appeals. We reverse and remand.
H/vl

?We review the trial court's jurisdiction decision for correctness. See Starways, Inc. v.
Curry, 1999 UT 50, P2r 980 P.2d 204. In all relevant ways, this case is factually identical to
our recent case, Fenn v. MLeads Enters., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah
Adv. 37. Thus, Fenn controls this case. In Fenn, the court held that HN2:?a company that
sends or causes one unsolicited, commercial email to be sent to a resident of Utah transacts
business in Utah within the meaning of the Utah long-arm statute, Utah Code section 78-2724- See Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-24 (1998); Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at P30. The [*2] court
also held that the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case comports with the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.; U.S. Const, amend. XIV. Thus, we hold that the trial
court incorrectly dismissed Weaver's claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
reverse the dismissal and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings, n l
Footnotes
n l Despite the concurrence's belatedly expressed misgivings, our understanding of the
difference between a purposeful act and an attenuated circumstance is whether the act was
intentional. It is clear in this case that the email was sent intentionally, and therefore
purposefully, to Utah. Moreover, we will not second-guess the legislature's determination that
this injury is far from trivial, but rather, serious enough to warrant a cause of action that
awards attorney fees as well as statutory damages.
End Footnotes

Norman H. Jackson, Judge
I CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

CONCURBY: Russell W. Bench
CONCUR:
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge [ * 3 ] (concurring in the result):
I agree that Fenn v. MLeads Enters., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 2004 UT App 412, 512 Utah Adv.
37, controls the outcome of this case. But I concur only in result because of my misgivings
about the holding in Fenn.
I dissented in Fenn because I do not believe that a single email can vest Utah with personal
jurisdiction over the defendant-sender where the plaintiff-recipient alleges no injury resulting
from the transmission of the email. In order to satisfy the jurisdictional inquiry, due process
requires that a nonresident defendant "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed.
2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958). This "requirement ensures that a defendant will not be
haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result o f . . . 'attenuated' contacts." Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 79 L Ed. 2d 790, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984)).
It is difficult to imagine a more attenuated contact than the one presented here: a single
email message sent [ * 4 ] to a lone Utah recipient. Here, as in Fenn, there is no allegation
"that the email caused any reputational, economic, emotional, or physical 'injury.'" Fenn,
2004 UT App 412 at P20. In both cases, the plaintiffs allege only statutory damages of ten
dollars. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105 (Supp. 2003).
To craft its single email rule, the Fenn majority relied in part on Starways, Inc. v. Curry,
1999 UT 50, 980 P.2d 204. In Starways, the Utah Supreme Court held that the nonresident
defendants' alleged transmission of libelous facsimiles vested Utah with jurisdiction. Id. at P9.
Although the Fenn majority recognized that the absence of alleged injury in Fenn
distinguished it from Starways, the majority concluded that this distinction was unimportant.
Fenn, 2004 UT App 412 at PP20-21. However, I believe that Starways should prevent Utah
from taking jurisdiction over cases where no injury is alleged.
The single email rule established by Fenn therefore improperly ignores the "'quality and
nature"' of the defendant's contact, vesting jurisdiction based solely on a single contact
within Utah, however [ * 5 ] trivial. Starways, 1999 UT 50 at P8 (quoting International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945)). Thus, contrary to
the view of my colleagues, I believe that intentional contact alone is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction. Moreover, the principle of judicial deference to legislative determinations should
play no role in our due process inquiry.
Nonetheless, I recognize that Fenn is now controlling precedent. I therefore reluctantly
concur in the result.
Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge
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RAYMOND WOOLFOLK v. ALBERT G. RUBIN
CIVIL NO. N-88-266 (EBB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20964

February 1, 1990, Decided
February 2, 1990, Filed
DISPOSITION: [*1]

Plaintiff's motion for judgment of damages granted.

JUDGES: ELLEN BREE BURNS, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
OPINIONBY: ELLEN BREE BURNS
OPINION: RULING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF DAMAGES
On November 13, 1989, summary judgment as to liability was entered against defendant,
Albert G. Rubin. Presently pending before the court is plaintiffs motion for judgment of
damages. Plaintiff moves for statutory damages of $ 1,000 in lieu of actual damages
pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. S 1692k(a)(2)(A) f
plus attorney's fees of $ 2,160 and costs of $ 120, for a total of $ 3,280. For the reasons set
forth below, plaintiffs motion is granted.
DISCUSSION
With respect to plaintiffs claim for statutory damages, the civil liability section of the FDCPA
provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to
comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable
to such person in an amount equal to the sum of —
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such
failure;
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, [ * 2 ] such
additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $
1,000;
* * *
(3) . . . the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee as determined by the court.

15 U.S.C. 5 1692k(a).

Citing Emanuel v. American Credit Exchange, 870 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir. 1989), defendant
argues that plaintiff must show actual damages to recover up to the statutory amount of $
1,000. In Emanuel, the court stated:

Emanuel did not plead nor prove that he suffered any specific loss, and thus he is
not deserving of actual damages. Considering the nature of American Credit's
noncompliance with the statute and the fact that its noncompliance was neither
frequent, persistent nor intentional, we also think that Emanuel should not
receive any "additional" damages, particularly since such damages are
discretionary, and no actual damages have been demonstrated.

Id. (citations omitted). This court does not interpret Emanuel to preclude an award of
statutory damages in any case where no actual damages have been proven.
Moreover, several courts have found that actual damages need not be proven before [ * 3 ]
statutory damages can be awarded. See Baker v. G.C. Services Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81
(9th Cir. 1982); Traverso v. Sharinn, Civil No. N-88-446 (WWE) (D. Conn. December 5,
1989); Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 174, 177 (W.D.N.Y. 1988): Harvey v.
United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221-22 (D. Oregon 1981).
In the instant action, the court awards the full $ 1,000 in statutory damages since the
defendant, an attorney, violated the FDCPA not only by failing to disclose that a letter sent to
the plaintiff was an attempt to collect a debt and that all information obtained would be used
for that purpose, but also by threatening to sue without authority, intent or capability.
With respect to plaintiffs claim for attorney's fees and costs, the court finds that, in view of
plaintiff's attorney's expertise in consumer law, her request for fees in this case is
reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is awarded $ 1,000 in statutory damages, $ 2,160 in
attorney's fees, and $ 120 for costs, for a total of $ 3,280.
SO ORDERED.
ELLEN BREE BURNS, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Dated [ * 4 ] at New Haven, Connecticut, this 1st day of February, 1990.
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